The ARYAN PATH

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THE THEOSOPHICAL MOVEMENT

THIS monthly publication of 16 pages blends the past and the present by reprinting old articles from H. P. B's *Theosophist* and *Lucifer*, and W. Q. Judge's *Path* as well as throwing the light of Theosophy on modern events. All articles are of practical interest.

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Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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VOL. V NOVEMBER 1934 No. 11

ON PROPAGANDA

It might seem curious at first blush that the modern apotheosis of advertising should have left propaganda still in ill repute. The distinction between advertisement and propaganda, however, is real, if somewhat subtle. Roughly we may differentiate between them thus: Propaganda as generally understood is the deliberate dissemination of ideas, tenets, doctrines. Advertisement in the usual sense is giving public notice of the availability, for a consideration, of goods or services. In general the lines are clearly drawn.

The instinctive popular reaction is friendly to advertising, hostile to propaganda. Why? Even otherwise intelligent people are guilelessly susceptible to advertising craft. They read advertisements with an indulgent eye and let their minds toy with alluring and extravagant rival claims of dentifrices, soaps, and travel routes. They may be vexed to see fair landscapes marred by advertising bill-boards, but subconsciously they register the products advertised, and perhaps purchase them.

An advertisement is selfish, but it is frankly so. Even Simple Simon can read in it, "Show me first your penny." He can understand and appreciate the Pieman's motives in advertising his wares. The average man tacitly accepts as a working hypothesis Mark Twain's composite picture of the human race as "a man with an axe on his shoulder proceeding toward a grindstone". A claim to disinterested motives arouses his suspicion at once; the offer of anything free evokes his contempt. He may never have heard of the Eastern doctrine of Karma but he has seen the moral law in action all his life; something for nothing is outside his ken. The instinctive reaction to a gift out of season or disproportionate to the mutual relationship is to question the

underlying motive—"What does the giver want from me?" *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

> Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money; come ye, buy, and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money and without price (*Isaiah* lv, 1).

It is not of record that the invitation of the old Hebrew prophet was accepted with more alacrity than it would be to-day. Suspicion of propaganda is not a modern trait—it is innate in man.

We are all open to currents of ideas. They flow through the mind and colour the thoughts of the sturdiest independent. But there is a difference between, for example, a country's welcoming an occasional foreign cruiser that touches at its shores and acquiescing in the permanent occupation of its waters by an alien fleet.

Resistance to propaganda is not inspired primarily by the urge to safeguard ideas already harboured, for frank agnostics are no less resentful than bigots at any attempt to rush their defences. It springs from each man's instinct to defend the right to think for himself. An advertisement does not arouse it. No advertisement can make us lifetime converts to a particular breakfast food or toilet preparation. If we try what it offers and do not like it, we are proof against advertisements of that preparation in future. No penalty attaches to its rejection.

"Embrace Islam or die!" That was propaganda *pur sang*, undisguised and to the point. A child offered that choice could grasp the desirability of turning Muslim. The Christian missionaries disguise the sword, but fundamentally their message is, "Believe or be damned." Accept the premise and the conclusion is inevitable that blind belief is the lesser of two evils. Hence the general wariness of propagandists' premises.

The sincerity of the propagandist is often in inverse ratio to his personal stake in the success of his efforts, but quite apart from that, implicit in all propaganda proper is a threat of violence to mental integrity. "We alone have the truth. Our teacher is unique. Everything outside our doctrines is lies and delusion"—thus the dogmatists in every faith, the followers of this, that, or the other leader. "Do as we do. Accept our pet cranks and practices or you can never become pure, never reach the heights"—thus the food faddists. Propaganda is deservedly suspect. The popular instinct to shy at it is sound.

But if the name of propaganda be given to proselytizing activities, where the attempt is to force beliefs on others willy-nilly, some other designation must be found for the disinterested effort to let those who will share what has been tried and found good by some. The propagandist hammers the seed into reluctant soil. The wise man lets his seeds of truth fall gently where he finds the soil prepared.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

संकल्पप्रभवान्कामांस्त्यक्त्वा सर्वानशेषतः ।

Abandoning every desire arising from imagination.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, VI. 24.

The sixth song of the Great Master contains the first of the lessons in Yoga—control of the senses, desires, thoughts. In verses 24-25 the beginner is told what to do, how to start on that long ascent which ultimately brings him to the summit from which the entire universe is seen. It will take him some time to catch the first view which will convince him beyond doubt that the climb is worth it; it will take him numerous lives before he comes to experience the dazzling splendour of the Universe of Light; and then, acclimatizing himself to it he will realize the radiance and the glory which is the source of that Light Itself. But a beginning has to be made and the earlier we start the better for us.

One of the main difficulties in the control of the senses and the mind is our fanciful imagination. The sights and the sounds from outside are easily shut out when the Soul takes hold of the mind and begins to use it for his own purposes. But sights and sounds also arise within ourselves and disturb the work of the Soul with the mind, and these are formidable. They are memory pictures which have deposited in the mind, during the course of work and play since the body was born, and as we go on we find out that they are even of previous lives. The mind is called the sixth sense and its threads and fibres are interwoven with and in the five senses. All the sense functions, trivial or important, colour the mind and affect its texture. Sense impressions are of the nature of images: every impression produces an image and changes the structure of the mind; every new image affects the old ones—some are wiped out, others fade out, and so on. Now these images result from the five senses and therefore possess the properties of each of them—they have colour, tone or note, smell, feel and taste. A similar but second class of images inhere in us as a result of the

function of the organs of action. Between these two sets of images there is difference, but for our purposes it is sufficient to say that they affect the mind—refine or coarsen its texture, brighten or dull its stuff, make for melody or discord. Now, these images are also vehicles of karma. Just as we have the whole complex machinery we call the brain, which is a unit, but every thought, will, feeling and deed changes it by affecting particularly one part or another, so also all these images compose a unit which represents karma. In esoteric language karma is compared to a lotus—it grows out of mud and water; its stem and leaves belong to the earthly part of man; the bud with its capacity to drink the dew of night, to inhale the light of dawn, to absorb the morning sun, represents the celestial part of man.

Therefore these images are the old soil from which new karma, new images come forth. Our ripe or prārabdha karma is a natural product of our past; but our present outlook, our discrimination, our inclinations and choices acted out, give each man a chance to improve himself, the slowly blossoming lotus bud. But for the aspirant who has chosen to tread the path and climb the mountain a new factor arises: he is called upon to abjure from creating new images; neither to dwell with past memory-pictures, nor to create by fancy, imagination, anticipation, new images, thereby strengthening his inner world of mirage. This is real renunciation: it is not the actions which are to be renounced but the force which compels actions. Similarly, our verse does not say that sankalpa-imagination is to be renounced, but that the desires (kāma) arising from it must be abandoned. This is important; for, just as a man renouncing action falls into the path of passivity, so also the man who refuses to treat his imagination correctly, and will not use it, believing that thus his desires will vanish, takes a wrong course.

We possess the power of imagination (kalpana-tarka-shakti). It is the highest power of man, because it is a compound power in which desire, thought, resolve, and will, all function. These others create partially but imagination creates completely. The other forces create in one state (loka) or another, but imagination is kriya-shakti, creative power, in every loka. Only one or other aspect of imagination is functioning at present; the true Magician alone uses to the full his faculty to build living images. Human evolution may be described as the process by which the Soul who is man recreates himself in order, in symmetry, in harmony, in beauty. This can only be done by imagination-sankalpa, not that fanciful tendency of Shaikh-chilli, but that faculty by which the Soul makes a matrix in matter and builds an image by filling up that matrix with the life-essence of his own being. This is utpatti, emanation.

Now if you go to our mythology you will find that sankalpa is called one of the Prajapatis, Creators of a

whole race of beings. This power ignorantly used, or misused is but a shadow of real Sankalpa, which is personified as a Prajapati. Again it is said that Sankalpa is one of the daughters of Daksha. Now Daksha is ability, dexterity and creativeness personified, and is the title of the parent-creator, lord of creatures, the father of celestial and terrestrial progeny, one of whom is Sankalpa, Imagination—a daughter who is married to Dharma, Law, Order, Wisdom. When Dharma, knowledge and wisdom, woos and weds Sankalpa, Imagination, then are born Dhyanis, true contemplators, who are also called Sankalpa-Siddhas, perfect makers or builders of Living Images. Just as our artists make pictures and statues, so these Dhyanis fill Akasha with pictures and portraits, idols and images, and we by ceasing to create our own pictures of kama —passionate sense, learn first to see and understand, and then to copy within ourselves, these images. Just as we see constellations in the night-sky, so do we see shining-pictures in the soul-sky, and gazing at them, contemplating them, we become like unto them. The Akasha is the real Temple of the Universe in which all Powers of Nature are Living Idols or Statues and if we worship our parents, Dharma-Wisdom and Sankalpa-Imagination, we will become an Idol in that Temple.

B. M.

The following is the closing paragraph of a summary-report of a paper on "Co-operative Research in Geography" by Prof. Alan G. Ogilvie read before the British Association for the Advancement of Science last September :—

"Take India as an example. In spite of voluminous official and other literature, we have still a great deal to learn of the geography of man in the sub-continent. Although the task of gathering the information there would be much more complex than in the case of Africa, there would be certain offsetting advantages. Among these are: the accuracy of the map of India, the existence of a great body of data created by the various scientific services, and a wonderful census organisation. In addition, there is the likelihood that men of science could be found on the spot who would be able to fill in the gaps in the picture of the physical environment. These might be asked to deal with the numerous connecting links which are not usually required for official departmental reports but are nevertheless essential to the geographer."

THE DILEMMA OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY

[In the following article the American psychologist and author, **C. Daly King,** stresses Western psychology's lack of philosophical background. It is precisely the possession of an adequate philosophical background that gives such richness and depth to Eastern psychology, which, in addition, is based upon, not decades, but millennia, of controlled experiments. May we carry Mr. King's suggestion one step farther, and point out that an adequate survey of the field is a quite indispensable preliminary to " the initial selection of the correct questions to be addressed "? Western experimenters are wasting much valuable time and energy in setting forth after psychological knowledge as if upon uncharted seas, instead of utilizing the careful and accurate maps drawn by their Oriental predecessors.—EDS.]

The field of Western psychology presents a most confusing picture to the newcomer. Is this a science at all, he wonders, when confronted by the controversies between behaviorists, Gestaltists, reflexologists, purposivists and many other so-called " schools ". The impression given by these contending cliques, taken *in toto,* is that they are going nowhere; it is not that individually they are not progressing experimentally and continuing to adduce more and more " proofs " for their respective positions; it is that the implications contained in the advance of one " school " are cancelled by the implications contained in the advance of an opposing " school ". The general inquirer need offer no apologies for his natural bewilderment.

Beneath all this confusion is the matrix of the conservative middle-grounders, condemning no clique, espousing none, continuing its own work in the hope that out of all the haphazard endeavour there will come, eventually, a mass of established data sufficient to indicate the limits and direction of the science. This hope is hopeless. It is not by directing general or random questions to "nature" that illuminating answers may be expected. All scientific work depends upon selection, and the initial selection of the correct questions to be addressed is essential to the prosecution of any successful research. A botanist who proceeds across country blindfolded and collects whatever his groping hands may chance to touch, is unlikely to return with valuable specimens.

It becomes plain that what is lacking is a philosophical background or any philosophical critique. The psychologist in general shies away from philosophy because he has a scientific technique of experiment which is utterly different from speculation or even from mere logic unsupported by objective evidence. In this attitude he is undoubtedly correct; which does not alter the fact that before he can make use of his special technique to any real purpose, he must needs possess a purely philosophical judgment as to the necessary direction for his researches to take. Modern Western psychol-

ogy has omitted this indispensable preliminary; such philosophy as is possessed by the reflexologists and similar "schools" is really too crude to merit the name; and the backgrounds of such sects as the Gestaltists are, to say the least of it, amorphous.

But all scientific work demands a definite philosophical basis. Physics, for example, has always had one, historically. Led recently into the cul-de-sac of a hasty hyperdimensionality, it is true that this basis has been lost, with the result that physicists to-day are uneasily seeking either to regain their old background or to develop a new one. It is to be hoped, and even expected, that those physicists who remain concerned with physics rather than with the far-fetched abstractions of higher-higher mathematics, will soon discover the firmness of new ground beneath their wandering feet. Only so can they continue to contribute to further physical knowledge. And only so can psychology, in its own field, progress toward a definite goal instead of creeping in a circle. For progress is progress *in a given direction*; it is not mere movement for its own sake.

Focusing our eyes again upon the present, we may observe that, in fact, there are only two real schools in Western psychology at present. We may call these the Spiritualists and the Materialists. As examples of the former we see purposivists, both hedonistic and hormic, psychoanalysts, panpsychists, Gestaltists; among the Materialists are to be noted behaviorists, reflexologists, response psychologists—to mention but a few. And of course we have the Confusionists, or middle-grounders, of whom it is impossible to say to which side they belong, since we find them now here, now there, sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, frequently nowhere.

This split within the body of Western psychological science bodes ill for its future progress, but carries with it, nevertheless, a certain fallacious justification. The Spiritualists evidently are primarily interested in subjective experience, while the Materialists' attention is focused entirely upon objective behaviour. The truth, however, is that psychology must deal with *both* these aspects of human life. Obviously there can be no objection to a division of the task among specialists, but the fallacy, for Spiritualists and Materialists alike, lies in this: that they have converted a specialization of research into a comprehensive dogma for the science as a whole, with the result that they are no longer engaged in a real psychology at all but simply in a distorted and crippled imitation of psychology. These distorted views of the fundamental background of psychology, with their characteristic over-emphasis on research problems of small psychological importance although of vital interest to disputants in a controversy, render much otherwise competent work of little value.

The Spiritualists, with their emphasis upon experience, have for the most part remained content

with the naïve assumption of some central entity which does the experiencing; when they attempt to go beyond this, they become immersed in irrational absurdities of the Jamesian "the-thoughts-themselves-are-the-thinkers" variety. The "souls," "minds," "egos," believed in by the Spiritualists, are shadowy and unknowable; and researches that assume the existence of quite imaginary "instincts" and "repressions" are unlikely to establish anything except that, when the literary but unscientific label, instinct, appears in the premise, it will also appear in the conclusion. But if "minds" and "souls" exist, it is up to the Spiritualists to adduce some scientific evidence to that effect; worse than anything else is their bland avoidance of their own first problem and their absorption in problems based upon an assumption that is entirely arbitrary and certainly primitive.

The Materialists base themselves upon physiology, and in numerous instances appear to lack sufficient knowledge of this sister science. After all, there is a difference between the physiology of man and of jelly-fish, or even of tape-worm. Physiological psychology concerns itself with researches upon mechanisms that are neither distinctively human nor physiologically important; and one may reasonably hazard the guess that it does so because it prefers ammunition for its battle with the Spiritualists to its proper task of carrying forward psychological discovery. The behavioristic "reflex" is a case in point; the reflex itself is no more than a logical, but untrue, abstraction from the actual fact of reflex arc conduction. A "reflex" is every bit as imaginary as a "soul," with even less excuse; but heaven knows how many behavioristic experiments are still being made in which the unscientific label, reflex, continues to appear in the conclusion only because it appears in the premise. The action of the central nervous system is undoubtedly the most important single physiological datum for psychology; and yet the reflexologists, who certainly ought to know better, appear to remain ignorant of the fact that the chief concern of the central nervous system (which they treat fragmentarily as a mere transmission device) is the supremely important phenomenon of integration. It is almost as if physiologists like Sherrington, Herrick and Cannon had never lived.

Both Spiritualists and Materialists omit any serious consideration of consciousness. The Spiritualists make the amazing assumption that the nature of consciousness is self-evident, when in plain fact it is almost impossible to think of anything less self-evident than the nature of consciousness. Yet here is a problem, not only prior to that of "minds" or "souls" but central to the whole science of psychology. If one is interested in experience, the final common denominator of all experience is consciousness of some type or other. The Materialists, on the other hand, offer only denials either of the existence or of the importance of consciousness,

and thus raise the intriguing mystery as to how, in its absence, there can be any psychology at all. It is, certainly, a brand new addition to scientific technique, this solution of a basic problem by the simple expedient of denying its existence.

And both the contending schools in Western psychology, when occasionally forced to make some passing reference to consciousness, fail to distinguish in any way between consciousness and conscious content, which they definitely assert to be synonymous terms. That is a stumbling-block which is final, unless demolished. It would be difficult indeed for a physicist to experiment upon the nature of light, if he persisted in confusing it with that of a lighted object.

Here is the dilemma of a psychology split between the two crude philosophic viewpoints of materialism and spiritual idealism. Nor is it resolved by the activities of the middle-grounders who, at their best, attempt no more than a tolerant reconciliation that is in fact impossible. The resolution of dualism is not to be found either in a tolerance that avoids the real issue or in the artificial forcing of real phenomena into the inadequate terms of either party. It is only to be achieved by the inauguration of another view, equally distinct from both prior ones, which incorporates their legitimate findings and discloses their theoretical fallacies.

Such a new and distinct envisagement of the psychological field can only be attained by a psychology that places prime importance upon the initial and crucial problem of consciousness. There are many other legitimate problems for psychology, but not one of them can be properly solved or even correctly evaluated in the scale of psychological worth until a rigidly scientific definition of consciousness and strictly objective evidence therefor are obtained.

So far as is known, there is but one small school in Western psychology that possesses a scientific, rather than a sentimental, interest in the consciousness problem. This is the school of Integrative Psychology, founded by Dr. William M. Marston during the last decade—and unfortunately its originator is not, for the time being, carrying forward those essential researches upon which its firm establishment must rest. The integrative viewpoint is not spiritualistic nor necessarily materialistic. It asserts that objective behaviour is determined at the synapses of the central nervous system where those integrations of nerve impulse groups take place which in fact originate and shape the subsequent behaviour, both explicit and implicit, of the organism. It further asserts that the energy generated upon the psychons of these synapses, when the impulse groups cross and combine, furnishes the conscious content of subjective experience. Thus in psychonic phenomena behaviour and passive experience meet; and when they are studied together in these phenomena we find a starting point for a *complete* psychology, that lends

itself, furthermore, to objective scientific measurement.

It is suggested that here is to be found a remedy for the materialistic fallacy. The strength of the Materialist position lies precisely in its insistence upon the investigation of definite, physiological actualities; its mistake is that it investigates relatively unimportant ones before achieving any basic relation between the phenomena of physiology and those of psychology—bad selection, due to an axe to grind against the Spiritualists, in conjunction with a surprising philosophic naïveté. Let the Materialists select from physiology the psychologically important, integrative phenomena of the central nervous system and they will find themselves, perhaps to their own astonishment, able to formulate *scientific* laws of experience that will remain forever beyond the abilities of their spiritualistic rivals.

Likewise in this approach we may not only see the fallacies of the Spiritualists laid bare but may even discern the first outlines of a possible remedy also. For this outlook possesses its own strength no less than does the materialistic view—its unshakable assertion of the reality of experience and experiencer. To go beyond this assertion only by inventing literary terms and using such non-objective inventions in the construction of experiments and theories that thus possess almost no scientific value at all, is its weakness. Its integrity will only find justification when it is willing to face the harsh truth which resides in the fact that psychonic energy furnishes the conscious content of a thoroughly passive experiencer. Here it will have need of a philosophy, not primitive but subtly searching. For even now it is possible to demonstrate that the "minds" or "souls" of which the Spiritualists so unthinkingly speak, are actually non-existent even if potentially actual. If but one-tenth of the researches now being carried forward by the Spiritualists upon quite unscientific "Gestalts," "incentives" and "complexes" were to be directed toward controlled experiment on the nature of the experiencer, it might well eventuate that before very long we should have some rational indications of the experiencer's potentiality and his eventual nature.

Only when the Materialists turn their attention to psychologically significant problems, only when the Spiritualists adopt an objective, instead of a subjectively speculative technique, shall we have arrived in the West at the threshold of a genuinely *scientific* psychology.

C. DALY KING

THE PHILOSOPHY OF A. N. WHITEHEAD

["Mankind is now in one of its rare moods of shifting its outlook. The mere compulsion of tradition has lost its force. It is our business—philosophers, students, and practical men—to re-create and re-enact a vision of the world, including those elements of reverence and order without which society lapses into riot and penetrated through and through with unflinching rationality."

"We stand at a moment when the course of history depends upon the calm reasonableness arising from a religious public opinion."

These two quotations are from *Adventures of Ideas* by A. N. Whitehead. To what extent has the great mathematician-philosopher succeeded in making his own contribution towards that work of re-creation to which he calls his peers and others? **J. D. Beresford's** survey mentions that Professor Whitehead says very little about Eastern religions; to which many an Asiatic reader of the volume will add that it suffers from a limitation inasmuch as it considers the race development with the Greeks and Plato as the starting point and neglects to weigh the influence of Buddhism and other earlier faiths along with that of Christianity which is taken for granted as supreme. The new world to be is not going to begin at Vienna and extend westwards to stop at Los Angeles. The re-creators of the Occidental culture will fail unless they look for the Light of the East, and recognize that Asia is not there only for exploitation.—EDS.]

Professor A. N. Whitehead has a peculiarly interesting mind, and one that differs in unexpected ways from the minds of those great mathematical contemporaries of his, with which we should, rather automatically perhaps, be inclined to class it. Einstein is predominantly a mathematician, and such of his pronouncements as have been published on speculative philosophical thought exhibit little more originality than those of his great predecessor Isaac Newton, when he left the realm of calculation for that of Biblical exegesis. Eddington's queer mixture of imagination and simple Quaker faith does not inspire great trust in his metaphysic—if he has one? He is capable of making such profound deductions as the suggestion that the ultimate constituent of matter is consciousness, but he has never, to my knowledge, drawn any deduction of value from that revolutionary premise. Jeans, with a slight effect of negligence, has elevated the vague concept of a mathematical God as a possible Totem; but he has probably no more respect for it than the pupil has for the master. And although we might hesitate longer in our assessment of Max Planck as a philosopher, he has not stated his beliefs in a form that permits a critical analysis.

Whitehead, although he began as a mathematician and physicist, has been intrigued by the mysteries of Being and Becoming. It may be that quite early in his mental life he had a tendency to follow the principle suggested by the aphorism, "Free men obey the rules which they themselves have made," taken from the last page of his book on *Symbolism*, (1927), the final passage of which is, also, worth quoting, namely, "Those societies which cannot combine

reverence to their symbols with freedom for revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or by the slow atrophy of a life, stifled by useless shadows." And however dangerous it may be to generalise from a single statement, it is tempting to find a kind of summary here of our philosopher's general attitude.

We see in him, for instance, the thinker who having postulated the necessity for original thought, still hesitates before the anticipation of anarchy. He may have felt that those rules he was making for himself could have no ultimate validity unless they were based on some respected authority. He was, we infer, too modest, too fearful, or possibly too closely restricted by the mathematician's reverence for the inductive process, to make a final declaration of independence and seek the explanation of the universe within his own mind. On the other hand, he realised from the outset that the "symbols" obtaining in the twentieth century, whether social or philosophical, must never be regarded as static, but need constant revision. And on that basis he has, so far, founded an acceptable system of evolutionary thought. He is, in short, a Platonist rather than an Aristotelian despite the fact that his original mathematical, scientific bent would, one might have thought, have been to take Aristotle rather than Plato as his chief authority.

This general attitude of Whitehead's may serve as an explanation for the criticisms I have dared to make in the examination of his *Adventures of Ideas*. So often he appears to be on the verge of the great discovery, but his reverence for the accepted symbols of the past two thousand years or so, restrains him from making the great refusal. I do not propose to use this test of hesitation between anarchy and observance as a criterion in what follows, since to do that would be an indication of personal prejudice, and unfair to Professor Whitehead. But in my further examination of these adventures of ideas, I have indicated here and there his failure to push his deductions to that length at which, loosed from the restraints of Platonism and Christianity, they would come into a near accord with the teachings of the Ancient Wisdom.

The following quotation, for instance, taken from the concluding lines of the chapter on "Aspects of Freedom," may serve as a preliminary instance:—

> There is a freedom lying beyond circumstance, derived from the direct intuition that life can be grounded upon its absorption in what is changeless amid change. This is the freedom at which Plato was groping . . . . . It is the freedom of that virtue directly derived from the source of all harmony. For it is conditioned only by the adequacy of understanding. And understanding has this quality that, however it be led up to, it issues in the soul freely conforming its nature to the supremacy of insight. It is the reconciliation of freedom with the compulsion of truth. In this sense the captive can be free, taking as his own the supreme insight, the indwelling persuasion towards the harmony which is the height of existence.

This passage occurs early in the

book, but the important conclusion to be derived from it does not very noticeably colour the further argument. It might seem that Professor Whitehead, pausing for a moment in his more objective survey, had stumbled upon what could have been the directing theme of his work, almost inadvertently—as if, perhaps, in this single instance he was not fully aware of what he knew. Moreover his reversion to other aspects of this reliance on the inner wisdom and to the resultant harmony that may follow is incidental to, rather than the main outcome of, his line of reasoning. For instance, he applauds as one of the "greatest intellectual discoveries in the history of religion," Plato's final conviction that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as "a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency" (p. 213), but regrets that Plato failed to co-ordinate this doctrine systematically with the rest of his metaphysical theory. He adds: "Indeed, Plato always failed in his attempts at systematization, and always succeeded in displaying depth of metaphysical intuition—the greatest metaphysician, the poorest systematic thinker." And we may perhaps wonder whether Professor Whitehead, surely an unusually gifted "systematic thinker," has himself fully succeeded in co-ordinating his recognition of the inner wisdom with "the rest of his metaphysical theory".

The book is divided into four sections, Sociological, Cosmological, Philosophical and Civilisation. On the first of these the author makes a fairly inclusive survey of the bias shown by Society in the course of the historical period, and demonstrates quite conclusively the astonishing quickening of the *tempo* in the last two or three generations. The yeast that has been slowly working throughout the last nineteen hundred years is, he believes, "the impracticable ethics of Christianity," but how slowly they have worked may be deduced from the further statement that "as society is now constituted, a literal adherence to the moral precepts scattered through the Gospels would mean sudden death". With that passage we may compare a comment in a later chapter in the Cosmological section, where he writes:—

> Profound flashes of insight remain ineffective for centuries, not because they are unknown, but by reason of dominant interests which inhibit reaction to that type of generality. The history of religion is the history of the countless generations required for interest to attach itself to profound ideas.

Of Eastern religion, Professor Whitehead says very little. Great scholar as he is, he appears to have given little attention to that ancient Source from which all the truths of subsequent rediscoveries have been derived. And almost the only passage in which he dwells thoughtfully for a moment on this source follows his reflection on the contention of Plato that "the joy of heaven is realisable on earth: the wise are happy." He sees this as an expression of mysticism and continues:—

> The mystical religion which most whole-heartedly adopts this attitude is

Buddhism. In it despair of this world is conjoined with a programme for the world's abolition by a mystic tranquillity. Christianity has wavered between Buddhistic renunciation, and its own impracticable ideals culminating in a crude Millennium within the temporal flux.... I hazard the prophecy that that religion will conquer which can render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact.

That last sentence has a hint of profundity, but a little consideration will show that this is not a prophecy, but a statement of fact which becomes obvious as soon as it is paraphrased and elaborated. For example, " eternal greatness " might be written " spiritual truth," and the religion that can bring home to the popular understanding the realisation that such a truth permeates and is primarily responsible for the phenomena of physical life, must inevitably conquer, since this principle and this alone is the single excuse for every religion that has ever been; religion as such being concerned to substitute eternal for temporal values. And if we shift the emphasis to accentuate *some* eternal greatness, that is to say one particular aspect of it which will penetrate the popular mind, we are left to choose between a physical demonstration such as the miracles of Christ, or such a statement as the world must accept as irrefutable. Neither can be finally effective. Christ, himself, summed up the first method when he said: "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe though one rose from the dead." And so far as the second method is concerned, we know that our " irrefutable statement " can only be some rendering of that inner wisdom which can be understood only by those who can find it in their own spirits. It cannot be taught in the ordinary sense, although it is possible within limits to help a few individuals to find it in themselves, and it must be for ever beyond the grasp of the "popular understanding".

The religious teacher, therefore, is, and has always been, ultimately driven back upon example and precept for the general good of mankind, a point emphasised, though possibly not fully realised by Professor Whitehead, in the last chapter of his cosmological section, on " The New Reformation ". Here, after pointing out that Protestant Christianity is "shewing all the signs of a steady decay," he suggests that "the religious spirit as an effective element in the affairs of men has just obtained [April, 1931] one of its most signal triumphs." His instance is that of "the moral authority of religious conviction," successfully exerted by Mahatma Gandhi (and Lord Irwin), in dealing with the forces in India which threatened "to overwhelm with violence hundreds of millions of mankind".

We may accept the instance without any contingent, but it is not one that fundamentally affects the essential question. It is perfectly true that when such a rare spirit as that of Gandhiji is able to demonstrate to the world the wonders of single-hearted devotion and self-abnega-

tion, the popular imagination is touched and there may follow a wave of feeling comparable to some kind of religious conversion. By this the immediate purpose of the devotee will be served for the good of mankind, but it is doubtful whether the general spiritual level *of understanding* of the masses is permanently raised.

I have dwelt more particularly on these aspects of Professor Whitehead's book because I believe them to be those of primary interest to readers of THE ARYAN PATH. But however vital and essential his underlying intuition of spiritual truth may be, (and that it is vital and essential is suggested by the fact that passages of this tenor recur in every section), his general purpose has been to write the "adventures of ideas" in the history of mankind and in his own "speculative scheme," submitting the necessary deductions to our own reason.

And if I may be allowed in conclusion to present my own reactions in reading rather than any critical commentary, I would say first that I was chiefly impressed by the remarkable freedom from prejudice evident throughout the work. One of his texts might have been taken from his favourite Plato's "Sophist": "We must be well content if we can provide an account not less likely than another's. We must remember that I who speak, and you who are my audience, are but men and should be satisfied to ask for no more than the likely story." He has in fact taken his own warning to the effect that "All advanced thinkers, sceptical or otherwise, are apt to be intolerant," and has brought his scholarship, his scientific insight and his lucid intelligence to the presentation of a case that can offend only the convinced dogmatist.

As to the summary finally suggested rather than presented, I cannot do better than quote his concluding words:—

> The Adventure of the Universe starts with the dream and reaps tragic Beauty. This is the secret of the union of Zest with Peace—That the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies. The immediate experience of this Final Fact, with its union of Youth and Tragedy, is the sense of Peace. In this way the World receives its persuasion towards such perfections as are possible for its diverse individual occasions.

This is a summary that no reader of THE ARYAN PATH would dispute. It contains a truth of the Ancient Wisdom. But the road is a long one and there are many paths through conflict to the satisfaction of that final Peace.

J. D. BERESFORD

ARYAN SYNTHESIS AND DRAVIDIAN CULTURE

[**Professor S. V. Venkateswara** is the author of *Indian Culture Through the Ages*. In the following article he evaluates the Dravidian contribution to the ancient Aryan Culture.—EDS.]

It is now generally accepted that the Dravidians cannot be considered as immigrants. The Brahuis of Baluchistan, who are Iranian in ethnic traits, but speak a Dravidian language, are accounted for as a cultural drift. The submerged Afro-Indo-Austral continent,* the home of primitive man, should have been the habitat of peoples who were pre-Dravidian rather than Dravidian. The Dravidians may have always been in India. South India is the heart and centre of the Dravidian Zone from the anthropological as well as the philological standpoint. There we have the most representative and vital specimens of Dravidian culture and stocks. In many respects this culture was independent of Aryan influences.

In social life the Dravidians had a strong and vital communal organisation, a matriarchal family and a system of inheritance in the female line. These survive to this day on the West Coast as at Marumakkathayam in Malabar and Aliya Santhanam in Canara, and form a contrast to the Aryan systems of family and society, based on agnate succession and primogeniture. Aryan funeral observances disclose the strength of agnate relationship, a cousin of the seventh remove being much closer of kin than a sister or other cognate relations. Aryan exogamy spares no cater-cousin on the paternal side, but is very lax on the side of maternal relationship. But the Dravidian family recognises relationship primarily on the maternal side. Its joint family system with impartible estates contrasts with that of the Aryan where, as early as the *Yajur Veda*, the individual was recognised as having an economic and social status of his own.

The Dravidians buried their dead, whereas the Aryans had them cremated. From ancient sites like Adichanallur (Tinnevelly District) have come numerous funeral urns containing dead bodies buried in the doubled-up embryonic position. The foreheads are bound with fillets of gold, and figurines of domestic animals, such as the dog and

* Those interested in the subject of this continent will do well to compare it with the Lemuria of H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* (II, pp. 323-24) thus described :—

" 'Lemuria,' as we have called the continent of the Third Race, was then a gigantic land. It covered the whole area of space from the foot of the Himalayas, which separated it from the inland sea rolling its waves over what is now Tibet, Mongolia, and the great desert of Schamo (Gobi) ; from Chittagong, westward to Hardwar, and eastward to Assam. From thence, it stretched South across what is known to us as Southern India, Ceylon, and Sumatra ; then embracing on its way, as we go South, Madagascar on its right hand and Australia and Tasmania on its left, it ran down to within a few degrees of the Antarctic Circle ; when, from Australia, an inland region on the Mother Continent in those ages, it extended far into the Pacific Ocean, not only beyond Rapa-nui (Teapy, or Easter Island) which now lies in latitude 26 S., and longitude 110 W. "—EDS.

the buffalo, are found placed near them. Apparently it was thought that these favourite animals, and the domestic utensils likewise placed near the body, would accompany the deceased to the other world. These very animals were considered unclean by the Aryans in India, whose preference for the cow and the bull is world-known. Similar burial urns are found in Babylonia and in ancient Crete. Dravidian peoples also raised megaliths which are analogous to those near the Pacific Ocean and the Caspian and Black Seas.

The ground plan of a Dravidian house compares with the Minoan in having cell-like basements built round a central court. It was Cyclopean in structure, whereas the Aryan house was usually of brick and wood. The huge stone houses of the non-Aryan peoples are mentioned in the *Rig-Veda.* Later Vedic texts speak of the use of iron among them, and of their extensive use of pots and earthenware. Aryan utensils were of copper or wood, and earthenware was rigorously excluded from religious ceremonies. Dravidians excelled in the ceramic art. Dr. Hall is in favour of tracing the pre-Sumerian pottery of Mesopotamia (Fifth Millennium B. C.) to India. The incised marks and symbols on the prehistoric pottery unearthed in Hyderabad (Deccan) point to Dravidian connection with the Minoan culture of ancient Crete. The mouths of the jars are hermetically sealed with bitumen, which again points to a Dravidian connection with Babylonia, as bitumen was not native to India.

Dravidians excelled in metallurgy and the mechanical arts. The earliest Vedic texts have no native word for iron. *Ayas* meant copper, and iron was described as black (*śyāma*) *ayas.* The smelting and casting of iron are unmentioned, and unknown, in Vedic times; and, even in later times, these occupations were relegated to inferior castes. On the other hand, in South Indian sites, artifacts of iron are found in succession to those of stone (neoliths). In fact no copper implements dissociated from iron ones have yet been discovered in an ancient site here. Iron was so popular in South India that the Nicobar Islanders as late as the first century A. D. continued their piratical quest for iron, as mentioned in Ptolemy's Geography. Mandeville mentions an ancient tradition to the effect that the Indian seas were so full of loadstone or adamant that no ship with iron bonds or nails ventured into the Indian Ocean.

But the greatest achievement of the Dravidian was in the art of navigation. Here were some things distinctively Dravidian. There are native words for "sail" and "mast" (*Pāy* and *Pāy-Maram*) and for boats of all sizes—dug-out (*doni*), raft (*teppam*) and decked vessel (*Kalam* and *Kappal*). The Dravidian paddle (*Chattakam*) was round or circular, not spade-like in form as in ancient China, or very long as in ancient Egypt. The vessels were built with prows at either end, so as to obviate the need for turning round in the narrow canals. The Aryan

words for boat (*nāva*), dug-out (*dāru*) and oar (*aritra*) occur only in the latest books (1 and 10) of the *Rig-Veda*, and there are no words for mast or sail or rudder. Nor is there any word for the *sea* common to the various branches of the Indo-European family of languages.

As regards religion and letters, we find the cult of the Mother Goddess developed among the Dravidians, agreeably to their high conception of the status of woman in society. There is no Earth Goddess traceable in Indo-European society or in the early Vedic texts. The first reference (*Prithvi*) is in a late book of the *Rig-Veda* (x. 18) and in the archæological ruins near Belliah in Bengal. In South Indian villages she appears as Piḍāri or Kāḷi, the Goddess of Divine Wrath, irate at the iniquities of human beings. And the worship of the Goddess appears in Western countries as well. But there were Goddesses peculiar to the South Indians. Mention may be made in particular of the Goddess of the Pox, of pestilence and of cholera. Special festivals were organised in unhealthy seasons when the hearts of men were struck with melancholy or their brains subject to evil humours and hypochondria. Tom-tom and music, dancing and pantomime were used to chase away these.

In mathematics Aryans used the decimal system of reckoning. In Vedic texts we have multiples of numbers by ten, and the 'teens reckoned on the decimal basis. But among the primitive peoples of the Minicoy Islands the duodecimal system is found prevailing to this day, as it prevailed among the ancient Sumerians. According to this system, 15 is 12 + 3, *not* 10 + 5. In music the Dravidians had peculiar modes like *Thullal* and *Jhampa*. In poetry they had distinctive metres like the *Vemba*. Among the musical instruments peculiar to them was the *Yāḷ*; they had also their own modes—*paṇ* and *tiram*, and *śindu*.

Aryan talent for synthesis is evidenced by the incorporation of these elements. Baudhayana and Apastamba, among the early givers of sacred laws, relax the rigour of Aryan exogamy and permit cousin marriage in South India, copying the Dravidian system. They also introduce new kinds of marriage; among them is marriage by capture, which is distinctly Dravidian. Burial was allowed to the Brahmins of Malabar, and was preferred in cases of contagious diseases like the pox. The dog was permitted within the sacred enclosure at the *Vaiśvadeva* rite. The prejudice against the use of mud pots died away and these found their way into temples and near images. Evidence of a duodecimal reckoning is found in the *Panchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*, with multiples carried 32 times. The Aryan and the Dravidian peacefully co-operated in the foreign commerce of India by sea. Some of the Indian exports had Aryan, while others bore the Dravidian, names assigned to them in India. If muslin (*sindhu* in Babylonian) and axe (*parasu*, *pilakku* in Assyria) belong to the former category, the peacock (*tohai*,

tugheim in Hebrew) and rice (*arisi*, *oryza* in Greek) belong to the latter. Lastly, the worship of the goddess crystallised into *Durga Pūjā* and *Srī Vidyā*.

Aryan genius for sublimation and transvaluation of values is evidenced by the philosophical and symbolical significance attached to crude conceptions in iconography. One principle of Aryan ethics is the extirpation of vice or misfortune, not by combating it but by meditating on the contrary virtue or benevolence. The Dravidian Goddess of the Pox was therefore renamed Śītaḷā (Goddess of Coolness); coolness in contemplation served to mitigate the rigour of the heat and dryness which is felt by the pox-stricken patient. To the Goddess of Divine Wrath, who was Dravidian, was attributed a mild and milky aspect as of the mother who appeased the hunger of Sambandha and Thāyumanavar in Aryo-Dravidian hagiology. Aryan emphasis on the spirit and on the transitory nature of the body, relaxed the attention bestowed on the burial, as evident from a contrast of the simple burial of historical times with the meticulous preservation of the corpse in hermetically sealed earthen jars of the prehistoric period. Dravidian festivals were retained, but they were affiliated to the Aryan ones founded on astronomical or planetary mythology. Non-Aryan cults based on the phallus were sublimated into the encyclopædic system of rite religion and philosophy known as Śaivism. Dravidian scripture in the Vernacular (*Nalayira prabandham*) was recognised by Vaishnavism as a mere translation of the essence of the Vedas. The tantric cults were endowed with symbolic content and made to yield high philosophy.

The strains of the Tamil poet Māṇikka Vāchakar are a good instance in point, describing the village beauty sporting on the green with her wooden balls (*ammānai*). Her sensuousness turns into a mystic delight. Her love and longing for earthly pleasures sublimate into the ineffable ecstasy of a beatific vision and flashes of the Infinite. I would render the passages as follows:—

When the bangles yield their tinkling and the ear-rings swing and wave,
And the raven locks dishevelled stray forth in artless curls,
And the coloured ball respondeth to her bosom's rise and fall;
Leaps her heart to flowing Ayyār, rose-hued for the sight divine.
"I know not him I seek for, wandering in the forest glade,
Mind and wood are thick with thought-trees all with sensuous fire ablaze;
In my braided hair the honied buds are sucked by wanton bees,
Oh! for lingering perfumed sweetness, for my Lord and Heaven's King!"
Ashy pale she turns to Śiva, decked in white of burnt desires:
"Him I see not whom I long for, Oh! Ammānai, sigh and see!"

S. V. VENKATESWARA

SILENCE

[In this article **Lady Vyvyan**, author and traveller, sounds, but as she herself indicates, naturally fails to plumb, the depths of her mysterious subject. The ancient Indian philosophy recognizes neither dead matter nor empty space; it describes the manifested universe as the plenum and it is full of Sound and Speech. The whole Kosmos in its objective form is Vaikhari Vach, uttered speech, whose soul is Madhyama, whose spirit is Pashyanti and whose rootless root is Para, which is the soundless sound, the Voice of the Silence. Krishna, the Hindu Logos, has among his Vibhutis or Excellencies—Silence. He says: " Among the Wise of Secret Knowledge I am Their Silence."—EDS.]

Ever since the first echo of human speech rang and died upon the air, man must have recognized, if he did not actually define, the worth of silence. Before ever a poet scanned his rhymes, interpolating syllables, marking a cæsura, silence alternating with sound had beat out the universal rhythm to whose law all natural forces are forever subject.

Groaning of the ice-pack, falling of a leaf, thunder's reverberation, backwash of a broken wave, howling of the storm-wind and whisper of a breeze, all are intermittent with the force that is credited, in the kingdom of sound, with a merely negative existence, the force that men have dowered with the strange, elusive name of Silence.

There are many, assuredly, for whom silence is only the flat-faced negation of sound, carrying *per se* no more significance than the mere absence of any of the other senses might carry, the absence of taste or touch or scent. They would join Robert Browning in his curt dismissal of silence as existing only to imply sound; only a deep intimacy with silence will lead one to realise that it has a quality and indeed a force of its own. Moreover, there is an experience connected with one of our five senses that goes far to strengthen such a theory; the absence of colour, interpreted in human phrase as the quality of whiteness, owns the strange power of absorbing into itself every ray of the sun, and it is possible that silence may operate in ways analogous; in other words, it is possible that silence, while appearing to be devoid of positive attributes may be unobtrusively the storehouse of great power.

It is perhaps easier to apprehend the meaning and scope of silence after considering what is the meaning and scope of sound. Every sound is a form of self-expression, every sound of nature and humanity is but a cry, uttered in plaint or growl or croon or alleluia, of " Me, me ". So it happens that the part of any listener is nothing more than surrender, in the guise of a victim, to the world-wide clamour of individuality, while the oratory of a tub-thumper is in truth no more insistent in its demand for a hearing, no more egocentric in its disregard for other personalities, only perhaps a little more

self-conscious, than bird-song or the sigh of wind or the roar of breaking waves or the ripple of a stream.

We are bound as listeners to suffer partial disintegration from the sounds that impinge upon us, and that no doubt is the explanation why those who sought to possess at least their own souls withdrew as hermits into places where no sound could touch them. Moreover in speech or sound there is always a triple journey to be made before one being can reach another; a journey from the soul of the speaker into the thing uttered, from the thing uttered across a great gulf into the thing heard, from the thing heard down into the soul of the listener. Seeing that this triple journey is inevitable before the act of listening, even of deliberate willing earnest listening, can reach its consummation, speech or sound as means of intercourse must needs be imperfect; a conclusion that inclines one readily to contemplate the rival merits of silence.

In such contemplation we shall become aware that there are more far-reaching effects of silence than the enabling of a man to possess his own soul. First of all there is in silence a means of direct communion with some individual, human or inanimate, a means quite independent of the clumsy action of the senses. The human spirit may, in deep surrender to the emanations of silence, achieve communion with a rock, a tree, a friend, a cloud. But that phrase "emanations of silence" has interposed a veil between us and the truth. If silence be indeed, as Carlyle said, the element in which great things fashion themselves, then silence is but a medium through which the emanations reach us. Imagination need not travel far to picture silence as a bridge between unknown worlds and the more receptive beings in our own universe. There is no reason to believe that such emanations come only from the human and inanimate individuals to which we have referred, and it may even be possible for men of fine perceptions, on entering a quiet place, to achieve communion with the very spirit of love, of mercy, of courage, of pity. At the mere thought of such a possibility veil after veil is lifted and we are carried far beyond the range of our senses into regions nearer abstract truth. For myself, I know not such experience, but even in this short lifetime I have once known direct communion with the spirit of Time. I knew it in an ancient Spanish town, in the dim aisle of a Romanesque cathedral some eight hundred years old.

The heavy, very ancient leather door fell softly to its jamb and I stepped down into twilight that flooded nave and aisles to the roof. My first impression was a vivid sense or memory of the sunshine in that square I had just left, of the noises in the city all now completely muffled by the leather door, the honking of cars, the shouting of urchins, the shrill talk of women; they seemed to die away reluctantly in that dim silent

place, like the reverberations of an echo. A moment later I had lost all memory of sound and sunlight, in contemplation of the massy pillars, for they, it seemed to me, were self-appointed guardians of the silence that hung within this building like a presence. So vivid was my sense of a living presence within the cathedral that I held my breath, apprehending that in another moment I would hear a voice or feel a touch. But after a while this restless feeling of expectation died away, consciousness of physical things was blotted out, and I was wrapt into the very spirit of Time that had gathered all the worship, prayer and praise which in eight hundred years men had offered to their God.

There is however another silence that may hardly be defined, that never may be sought and found at will. When we say that there is a silence wherein one human soul achieves contact with the spirit at the back of all things, our words are but fumbling round things inexpressible. If we should attempt to represent this silence in pictorial fashion, we should draw first, for the sake of contrast, a man in the act of speech, and our picture would be that of a little bipèd radiating spokes from his own person, these spokes forming a shield or veil so that the light of the sun can never fall directly on him, nor the wind's breath shake his equilibrium, nor any emanation reach him from the soil. Then there would be the same figure, now mute, clear in outline, and upon him fall gigantic rays from the far spaces of earth and sky; he is in communication with all the world; in such a pose, at such a moment, an ant's movement and the roar of an avalanche may awaken similar echoes, for, in the clarity of his own silence, vibrations indescribably faint and inexpressibly far may be enhanced, enshrined, perpetuated.

It is clear then that all those, whether they be hermits or world-listeners or other-world listeners, who recognize that silence is something other than and something greater than the negation of sound, will own that all through the ages the powers and products of silence have been innumerable. Some, like the leader of the Chorus in Agamemnon, have "learnt to drug all woes by silence". Some, like Savonarola, have prescribed it as an aid to devotion, while Street and other writers have advocated its use as a stepping-stone to fortitude. Thoreau, Maeterlinck and others characterize it as a prelude to friendship, and to Carlyle it is the sole repository of greatness. For Oliver Wendell Holmes it has a healing property after the blows of sound.

Moreover, in epic, history and drama, silence has played a notable rather than a negative part, for there has always been momentary experience of joy and anguish that would cut deep across the path of accustomed life, evoking not a cry of gladness nor a wail of sorrow, but the silence wherein feeling glows like molten fire; experience when perhaps the struggle of a lifetime comes face to face with

failure or success, when despair turns feeling to stone and expression of feeling to muteness, when resolution must be sealed with something stronger than speech, when joy emerging from the fetters of language can only reach the greatest heights in silence. Such was the silence of Cortez on that peak in Darien; of Clytemnestra before and after she committed murder that fulfilled the House of Atreus' doom; of Eliphaz and Bildad and Zophar who sat upon the ground seven days and seven nights by the side of their unhappy friend; of Niobe wordless at the tomb of her children, transformed into a stone that she might be through the ages a symbol of dumb grief; of Captain Macwhirr and Cordelia and Chryses the priest and many another famed in history or fiction. And always such a silence would prolong the action or heighten the emotion, being poignant as the reverberation of a deep-toned bell.

So much for silence as a medium of understanding and silence as a force directed to some end and silence as a form of self-expression more eloquent than speech; but what of silence as integral part of nature, a property of stones, an efflux of the stars?

Many human beings, without adhering to a pantheistic or any other creed, have sought these silent aspects of nature as flowers turn to the sun. It is not possible to define the character of man's communion with a silence of nature that, like some clear jewel in ornate setting, is often to be found encircled by earth's multifarious voices. Among animate forms the tribes of butterflies and fishes are mute exceptions to creatures that express themselves in tones ranging from nightingale melody to the squeak of rodents. As for inanimate forms, nearly every one is subject sooner or later to that lord of nature's music, who has been dowered with power to awaken the very stones; the forest with a million leaves and branches will lend itself as a single harpstring to his touch, and the little grasses whisper to each other under his caress, and the billows gathering momentum at his command will be hurried with a roar to dissolution. Yet there are times and places in which the wind will neither roar nor wail nor whisper, and there are moreover the stars that from ancient days have kept their counsel in serenity, and the mountain tops that hold inviolate silence as in some cloud-defended sanctuary.

It was no doubt the silence of the hills that inspired the Psalmist to lift his eyes thither for help, and, ever since his day, silence has drawn to the heights men of every calibre; the mystic, the adventurer, the man of action and the man of thought, the man who sought escape from self and the man who sought to find himself. Archdeacon Hudson Stuck on the summit of Mount Denali and Seton Gordon in his well-loved Hebrides, Robert Service with phrases hard-bitten as the features of a Klondike pioneer, Obermann the plaintive pessimist and Miguel de Unamuno from the sanctuary of Nuestra Señora de la Peña de Francia,

these are a few among the mountain-lovers who have borne witness to the spell of mountain silence.

As for those poets who celebrate the silence of the stars, they are innumerable. Wordsworth in quiet communion with the "silence that is in the starry sky" stormed a citadel impregnable to all man's restless questioning. Heine read in the many-thousand-year-long silence of the stars what he also read in the face of his beloved. Matthew Arnold went so far as to hold up the quiet stars for a moral example:—

> These demand not that the things without them
> Yield them love, amusement, sympathy.

In truth those who have paid homage to silence as integral part of nature have done so in every attitude and manner, ranging from Walt Whitman's boisterous fellowship with the sun—"Give me the splendid silent sun"—to Pascal's timorous recognition of the silence of space: "Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie." Yet every one of those to whom we have referred has done nothing more than express his own emotional reaction to one form or another of nature's silence.

In the world of men who have won dominion over steam and electricity, where mechanism is the doorway to their Paradise of speed, what part can silence play save a Devil's negation of their new-found deity? But there are others who have never sought nor won dominion over things that we can see. What can the silence of a Quakers' meeting say to them? Or the owl's mysterious flight? Or the quiet shining of the stars? Or the stillness of new-fallen snow? Or the movement of a tide "too full for sound or foam"? It may be that for them these soundless things express life's deepest meaning.

Yet, as our words go probing, pushing, circling, with denial or definition or eulogy, we are still far from the heart of silence. In this world of every day that we call Life, it sometimes seems as if silence were no more than a little star pricking the universal background of sound and movement. It may be that in some other world silence is the universal background and every sound but a Devil's whispered protest to the God that said "Be still." Or it may be, in that other world, that silence is an element which will never for a moment project one particle of itself in sound or movement, but for ever in quietude will absorb into its own stillness the sounds that break against it.

Imagine what we may about the silence in worlds heretofore and worlds hereafter, we can never change surmise for certainty, but in our world to-day we may well believe that each man finds in silence his deepest need which is his own ideal. Certain it is that man has nearly always found in silence exactly what he sought; the wanderer has found rest, the troubled spirit power to endure, the lonely man his friend, the worshipper his deity.

C. C. VYVYAN

A DEFENDER OF THE PHLOGISTON THEORY

[**Dorothy Turner, M. A., B. Sc., Ph. D. (London)** wrote for us in August 1933 on Joseph Priestley, the discoverer of oxygen. Here she briefly surveys the history of the Phlogiston theory held by Priestley and shows how it came to be discarded by later scientists.—EDS.]

The Phlogiston Theory which was used by chemists of the eighteenth century to account for the behaviour of burning substances marks the transition from alchemy to modern chemistry. The theory underwent several modifications and survived in a corrupted form until the early nineteenth century. But its originator would scarcely have recognized the misinterpretations of later times.

In a previous article, we discussed how Joseph Priestley adopted the language of the Phlogiston Theory in naming his compounds and in explaining their reactions. The significance of the theory in the work of Priestley and other chemists of the eighteenth century is brought out clearly in the writings of Richard Kirwan who was born in Ireland in 1733, the year which also witnessed the birth of Joseph Priestley. Like many another philosopher of the eighteenth century, Kirwan possessed wealth and leisure. His early studies in chemistry were made during a sojourn in France and the experiments he made in his private laboratory in Ireland soon made him familiar with the main results of chemistry available in his day. His most formative years were spent in London where he made the acquaintance of Priestley, Cavendish and other Fellows of the Royal Society. Throughout his life he kept in touch with men of science in England and on the Continent, carrying on a wide correspondence and continually enriching his library with scientific publications. After ten years spent in London, Kirwan published his most important work, *An Essay on Phlogiston and the Constitution of Acids* (1787). In this book he discusses the origins of the Phlogiston Theory and shows how the chemists of his day sought to interpret the results of their experiments in terms of that theory. Kirwan tells us how among the alchemists, sulphur was regarded as having the "quality of inflammability" but that the German metallurgist Becher (1635–82), recognizing that sulphur was not present in many inflammable substances, had to suppose the existence of an "inflammable principle" common to sulphur and to other combustible substances.

The Phlogiston Theory thus grew out of the beliefs about combustion current at a time when the confused notions of the alchemists still echoed through men's thoughts. The doctrine of Phlogiston, which was first clearly stated by Becher's disciple, Ernst Stahl (1660–1734), indeed contains many remnants of alchemistic thought.

Stahl, for instance, defined Phlogiston as the Principle of Fire (*materia et principium ignis, non ipse ignis, Ego Phlogiston appellare coepi*). The distinction between a substance and its principle was entirely in the tradition of alchemy. Again, the alchemists had believed that fire is a purifier of bodies, the burning of a substance always resulting in a splitting up into simpler constituents. So we find Stahl and his immediate followers picturing Phlogiston as escaping from the burning substance. This notion of a *loss* of something during combustion became so fixed in men's minds that it was long before they became convinced that burning involves the *addition* of something.

The belief that burning involves a loss is readily understood when we bear in mind that the products of the burning of common substances such as wood, sulphur, charcoal, oil and fats are all gaseous, the substances thus "burning away," leaving but a slight residue. Consequently, at a time when chemists were concerned with changes in appearance rather than with exact measurements, they were ready enough to believe that the burning substance had lost something, namely Phlogiston, which had escaped into the surrounding air. Again we must remember that in the days of Stahl, notions about gases were very hazy. It is true that experimenters of the seventeenth century had shown that air has weight, and Boyle's experiments had led him to suspect that only part of the air is necessary for breathing and burning—the air far from being a homogeneous substance being actually a mixture of gases. But Boyle's views had not received general recognition in the time of Stahl; indeed many chemists still thought of the air as one of the four "elements," and the existence of other gases was as yet not generally recognized.

By the time Kirwan came to write his *Essay on Phlogiston*, however, chemists knew far more about gases than in the days of Stahl. Thus "fixed air" (now known as carbon dioxide) had been obtained by Black, "dephlogisticated air" (oxygen) had been isolated by Priestley, "inflammable air" (hydrogen) had been prepared by Cavendish and "dephlogisticated marine acid" (chlorine) had been investigated by the Swedish chemist, Scheele. Each of the experimenters we have named endeavoured to interpret his results according to the Phlogiston Theory. The explanations seemed plausible enough at first. But it was in the very attempts to make the theory fit the facts of later experience that the real confusion began.

It was known, for instance, that lead, when heated in a strong fire for a considerable time, became converted into a yellow powder which was called the calx. The lead was supposed to have lost its Phlogiston in the process. If the calx was heated with charcoal, the original lead was obtained once more. This was interpreted by supposing that the charcoal was very rich in Phlogiston and so had

restored the lost Phlogiston to the calx, thus giving lead once more. So far, if the premise be granted, the reasoning is unassailable. But when the metallic calx was found to weigh more than the original metal, chemists were forced to the conclusion that a loss of Phlogiston causes a gain in weight. This conclusion, according to Kirwan, "did not shake the credit of this favourite hypothesis," the gain being attributed to an "accession of igneous particles" or to the fact that Phlogiston was a "principle of levity".

When the Phlogiston Theory was adopted to explain certain reactions of acids and the production of "dephlogisticated marine acid" by the action of heat on a mixture of "marine acid" (hydrochloric acid) and pyrolusite, the function ascribed to Phlogiston became that which later results showed to be played by "inflammable air" or hydrogen. Indeed Kirwan, together with Priestley, Cavendish and other chemists of the time, came to regard Phlogiston as identical with "inflammable air". Thus Phlogiston, at one time regarded as an intangible principle, at last became identified with a gas which could be weighed and examined, having thus all the properties ascribed to a substance. Here, then, was a complete change in the basic conception of the nature of the illusive Phlogiston.

When Kirwan defended the Phlogiston Theory, the results of Lavoisier (1743-94) had become known. Lavoisier's crucial experiment consisted in heating a known weight of mercury in contact with a measured volume of air for twelve days. At the end of that time, he noted the diminution of the volume of the air and weighed the resulting calx of mercury. He found that the residual air did not support burning. He then heated the red calx, and obtained from it the exact volume of air previously absorbed and the exact weight of mercury he had originally. On these results, Lavoisier based his theory of combustion, by which he concluded that the air consists of at least two gases, one of which combines with metals to produce a calx, thus causing an increase in weight. His conclusion was, therefore, just the opposite of the opinions held by the Phlogistonists of the time.

Lavoisier's views were not accepted immediately by the scientific world. Kirwan endeavoured to balance the arguments on both sides and to adjudge their value. But he betrays his partizanship for the Phlogiston Theory at the outset when he says that though many arguments favour the new views (that is, Lavoisier's) yet the old system "though it originated in a less enlightened age, yet it originated in a country in which chemical knowledge then was and still is more advanced than in any other part of Europe. For it is to Germany that all modern nations must resort, to improve in mineralogy and metallurgy as the ancients did to Greece to improve in oratory."

Such an argument in favour of the Phlogiston Theory is rather naïve but it is certainly free

from the exaggerated national pride which has, alas, sometimes obtruded itself into scientific discussions in an age which should be more enlightened than that of Kirwan. In spite of his predilection in favour of German theories, however, Kirwan goes on to say:—

> Prejudices of all kinds should certainly be laid aside in all scientifical enquiries; truth if it can *evidently* be traced, or if not, the *internal probability* of any principle, should be the only motive of our attachment to it. Now that doctrine must be accounted the least probable which fails oftenest in explaining the phenomena. . . . . this is the case of the anti-phlogistic hypothesis.

Kirwan then explains how Lavoisier, the champion of the anti-phlogistic hypothesis—

> was undoubtedly the first who proved by direct and indirect experiments, that the weight which metals gain by calcination corresponds to that of the air which they absorb. He was also the first who published that the air consists of two fluids, the one which he calls vital air and the other foul or mephitic air . . . On these grounds, Mr. Lavoisier reversed the ancient hypothesis . . . He supposes that inflammable bodies are such as have in a certain degree of heat, a strong affinity to pure air and he proved by experiment that the remains of these bodies after inflammation contain a substance which they did not contain before.

The above extract shows that Kirwan appreciated the significance of Lavoisier's results. Nevertheless he still had leanings towards the Phlogiston Theory, for he goes on to say that the whole controversy narrows itself down "to deciding whether the *inflammable principle* is found in the phlogisticated acids, vegetable acids, fixed air, sulphur, phosphorus, sugar, charcoal and metals". Further, we learn that, although Kirwan is convinced of the compound nature of water, he thinks it is not yet proved whether in the solution of a metal in an acid, the "inflammable air" comes from the acid, the water or the metal itself.

A year after the publication of Kirwan's *Essay*, a French edition appeared, translated by Mme. Lavoisier and with comments by Lavoisier himself. In 1789 a second English edition was published with the criticisms of Lavoisier and others printed *in extenso*. Still Kirwan continued to defend the older theory. It was not until three years later that he became convinced that the results of Lavoisier could not be reconciled with the Phlogiston Theory. He then realized that the old theory was of no further use to the chemist and he openly acknowledged himself a convert to Lavoisier's views.

Kirwan was a prolific writer and honours were conferred on him from the learned societies of Great Britain and the Continent. He died in Ireland in 1812, an active President of the Royal Irish Academy until his last days.

DOROTHY TURNER

THE MOTHERS OF INDIA'S SAINTS

[Many of our readers will recall the article on "Indian Women" which appeared in our second volume, in which Dr. N. B. Parulekar called woman "the heart of Indian civilization". He wrote:—"As I look around for a clue to the happiness in Indian homes, and the loving hospitality present everywhere in the country, lives of self-effacing women stand out before me." A few such lives are sketched for us below, by **Mrs. A. J. Appasamy, B. A.**—EDS.]

It is very difficult to get facts concerning the childhood of our great men. Many biographers omit their childhood altogether and only write at length about their work and influence, while some make but a passing reference to childhood. Often there are nothing but legends to tell us of their childhood and we are at a loss to sift facts from fiction. Where an autobiography of the saint himself exists it is a great help. Here the soul speaks for itself, revealing its inner experiences and its early recollections, and tells lovingly of persons who helped its spiritual growth.

The part played by their mother or grandmother in moulding the spiritual lives of our great men has come as a revelation to me, accustomed as I have been to the criticism made of the Indian mother, that she is illiterate and without any capacity for bringing up her children. The books written about Indian women, mostly by outsiders, contain either undeserved criticism or sentimental praise. The real Indian woman does not deserve either. It is true that many Indian women do not know the language of modern psychology. They may be unlettered but they are the product of centuries of our own civilization and culture. Though ignorant of letters they are steeped in the religious ideas and the literature of the country. I know of a lady who belonged to the last century. Though she did not even know how to read, she was familiar with the Hindu Scriptures. She knew the Tamil *Ramayana* by heart and explained its stanzas to her two sons. Years afterwards her sons became well-known for their piety and learning. She lived in one of India's insignificant villages in the Tamil country.

An Indian writer says, "Nobility in women does not depend upon race, but upon ideals; it is the outcome of a certain view of life."* The Indian mother does not lack high ideals. On the contrary she has a keen sense of values. Those who nurtured the saints put into the minds of their children very early that the search for God was the only worth-while pursuit in life.

The women of India are indeed confined to their homes with no opportunities for presiding at meetings or lecturing on platforms, but in the home they are most capable, loving and devoted. That is why the very name of mother is sacred

* Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Siva*, p. 94.

to every Indian. Men in India often speak of God as their Mother, a term full of vivid memories and associations. This way of addressing God is peculiar to Indian saints. Tukaram sings :—

A babe goes to his mother for comfort without any further thought
His mother knows exactly what he wants and rushes to him with fond delight.
A babe sees no difference between a rope or snake,
He will touch fire or anything else.
He knows nothing about anything but his mother.*

Ramakrishna Paramahamsa invariably used the term Mother to describe God.

Behold, a mother hath several children, and to each one of them sweet-something she giveth,

To one she giveth a pop-gun, to another she giveth a cake; to one a gim-crack, to another a doll,

And sweetly they play and seek not the mother, and the mother, unhindered, doeth her works.

And one of them throweth away his toy and crieth, My Mother, O Mother, where art thou, O Mother? :—

To him she runneth with haste and taketh him up and kisseth and fondleth him and sootheth him to rest:

Ah, Man, even so thou art engrossed in playing with the gew-gaws, the toys of the world:

Ah, know them: they are toys! ah, throw them away, and call, crying for the Mother, the Lord.

And verily, the Mother, the Lord, will come to thee, running and smiling, and bring thee Peace and Rest for ever!†

Ramprasad says, "My mind is firm, and my gift to the priest well made. Mother, my Mother, my all is finished. I have offered my gift".‡

Mahatma Gandhi speaks of his mother thus: "The outstanding impression that my mother has left on my memory is one of saintliness."§ She was deeply religious and after her daily prayers only she took her meals. She visited the temple every day and kept her religious fasts. Sometimes she made very difficult vows and kept them without flinching. Even illness was not allowed to interfere with the fulfilling of them. She fasted for two or three days in succession. During her fasts she had only one meal a day or went without any. Sometimes she made a vow that she would not take food without seeing the sun. On those days her children would go out, watching the sky anxiously for the sun to appear. During the rainy season the fugitive sun would hide itself under a cloud before their mother came out to see for herself. But she would cheerfully go back saying that God did not mean that she should eat that day. Gandhiji also speaks of her as a very intelligent woman with strong common sense and a knowledge of the affairs of the state of which her husband was the Prime Minister. Her friends and acquaintances thought very highly of her. Mahatma Gandhi has some treasured recollections of his mother's lively discussions with her friends. When we read the Mahatma's account of his mother we find that mother and son are very much alike. Her capacity for self-control and her spirit of self-sacrifice she has given in full measure to her illustrious son. It seemed a small thing when she observed religious fasts for her own sake;

* Deming, *Selections from Tukaram*, p. 122.

† Ramkrishna, *Studies in Universal Religion*, p. 464.

‡ E. J. Thompson and A. M. Spencer, *Bengali Religious Lyrics, Sakta*, p. 69.

§ C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, p. 21.

but when the Mahatma fasts for his countrymen that they may realize the sin of untouchability we realize the full significance of such a sacrifice. The critic may speak lightly of it, but it appeals to our deepest nature and criticism cannot touch it.

Maharishi Devandranath Tagore begins his Autobiography thus: "My grandmother was very fond of me. To me, also she was all in all during the days of my childhood. My sleeping, my sitting, eating, all were at her side."* His grandmother was the head of the household and managed all things efficiently. Early in the morning she bathed in the Ganges and made a garland for the family shrine with her own hands. She also made vows for worshipping the sun. On those days she remained on the terrace saying her prayers from sunrise to sunset. These prayers became very familiar to the child Devandranath. She often went on pilgrimages and arranged for religious music parties in the house. Devandranath used to keep awake in his bed listening to the music. His grandmother's skill in managing the house was so great that in that large joint-family household everything went on smoothly and without a hitch. She was very industrious and did most of the work herself. After all the people had taken their meals she went to take hers which she prepared with her own hands. It was the food prescribed in the sacred book for religious persons and consisted of rice and vegetables cooked with ghee. Her grandson writes of her :—

> She was as lovely in appearance as she was skilled in her work, and steadfast in her religious faith. There was a certain freedom of mind in her, together with her blind faith in religion.†

The next picture we get of her is as she lay dying near the banks of the Ganges. It is thought to be a merit to die on the banks of the Ganges. She got seriously ill, but she did not want to die yet. Still despite her protests she was taken to the banks of the Ganges and kept in a thatched shed. On the night of her death the full moon lit the sky and the musicians were singing that it was sweet to die uttering the name of God. She died with the name of her God on her lips and one finger pointing upwards. When Devandranath saw her thus it seemed as if she pointed out to him God and the Hereafter. A strange peace filled him and a knowledge of the futility of a worldly life gripped him. He writes, "As Didima was my friend in this life so was she my guide to the next".‡

Later in life he preached strongly against idolatry, but the spirit in which religion was practised by his grandmother made a deep impression on him. It was she who first impressed on his mind the need for God.

Devandranath's only reference to his mother is very significant. When his father died he had to perform the funeral ceremony.

* Maharishi Devandranath Tagore, *Autobiography*, p. 35.
† *Ibid.*, p. 36. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Long before that he had given up idolatrous practices, as his conscience told him they were wrong. Without the family idol the ceremony could not be performed. If he did not allow the family idol to be brought there he would seriously offend his relations and friends. He was very troubled about this and went to bed wondering whether he was brave enough to face the ordeal. Presently he had a vision of his mother who gave him the courage he needed. He writes,

> My mother appeared. Her hair was loose, just as I had seen it on the day of her death. When she died I never thought she was dead. Even when I came back from the burning ground after performing her funeral ceremonies, I could not believe that she was dead. I felt that she was still alive. Now I saw that living mother of mine before me.*

She said that she came now to see her son to tell him that she approved of the progress he was making in his spiritual life. His mother's words filled him with great courage and joy. When the time came he performed the ceremony without the idol, and his friends and relations left the place in a body before the ceremony began. The Maharishi's protest against idolatry has had far-flung consequences. The Brahmo Samaj has from that day steadily set its face against idolatry.

The home of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa was deeply religious. Both his parents were wholly devoted to God. His father was an upright man and refused to bear false witness in favour of his landowner, who immediately deprived him of his home and lands; the family became quite poor and went to live in another place. His father was other-worldly minded and did not care to earn much money. The family had always to be satisfied with the bare necessities of life. The facts concerning the childhood of Ramakrishna are very few. But we find some references to his mother. She was simple, kind and religious. She and her husband kept up a high standard of religious life in the home. Later in life when Ramakrishna became famous, one of his disciples came to see her. He begged her to take a thousand rupees from him as a small offering for the spiritual help he had received from the saint. She was poor and in great need, but she would not take a single rupee from him.

Ramakrishna as a boy was married to a girl four years old. When he saw her again she was fourteen. He told her frankly that he was not interested in the life of a householder but was attracted beyond measure to the religious life. But he was willing to abide by her decision as he owed her a duty. She allowed him generously to have his own way, and chose the religious life for herself also. At fourteen she was called upon to make a great decision and she did it wisely and well.

The mother of Sadhu Sunder Singh had a wonderful influence over him. He says that when he was a child she refused to give him food before he had said his prayers.

* *Ibid.*, p. 117.

He resented this very often, but the practice took a great hold on him. In after years he always spoke with the deepest affection and respect of his mother. His face lighted up whenever he spoke of her. His talks to mothers were always based upon his own experience of his mother's influence over him. A minister once asked him to take a course in a theological seminary, but he replied that he had been to the best theological seminary—the bosom of his mother. He told the Archbishop of Canterbury: "If I do not see my mother in heaven I shall ask God to send me to hell so that I may be with her."*

It was she who constantly held before him the life of a sadhu, and asked him to seek for the inner peace. She took him to priests and sadhus so that they might show him the way to attain the inner peace. "You must not," she used to say, "be careless and worldly like your brothers. You must seek peace of soul and love religion, and some day you must become a holy sadhu." "It was the Holy Ghost," he said once, "who made me a Christian, but it was my mother who made me a sadhu."†

A word in conclusion. New ideals have transformed women considerably during the last few years. Many women, both educated and uneducated, are full of a passionate desire for social service and political freedom. One of the leading women of India, remarkable for the work she is doing for women and children, said to me, "We must be free or die." She is very religious too. Another left her husband and three children and went to prison twice. When asked about her religion she replied, "My country is my religion." Along with these modern women with new ideas brought out by changing conditions there will always be in India, I think, the old-time mother with religion as her primary object in life.

G. R. APPASWAMY

* Streeter and Appasamy, *The Sadhu*, p. 3. † *Ibid*, p. 243.

THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH IN JAPANESE BUDDHISM

[For many years the means to salvation was a prominent *casus belli* in Christian lands. From Luther's repudiation of faith without works sprang the Protestant Reformation, which has so profoundly affected every field of human thought. Mr. M. G. Mori, author of *Buddhism and Faith,* who has contributed several articles on Buddhism to THE ARYAN PATH, here describes the reverse tendency as manifested in some heretical Buddhist sects in Japan.—EDS.]

Buddhism is based on the doctrine of ethical causation. It teaches that man must help himself. The Buddha said to His disciples as they gathered around His death-bed: "Work out your own salvation with diligence!" This cardinal principle of self-reliance as essential to the attainment of Supreme Enlightenment is accepted and followed by Hinayana, or Thera Vada Buddhism, and by all those sects of Mahayana, or Developed Buddhism, which are called in Japan by the collective name of Shōdō-mon, *i.e.*, "the Gate of the Noble Way". Having apprehended the "Four Great Truths," a Buddhist following any of these schools must tread assiduously the "Noble Eightfold Path," practising the precepts in daily life and working his way up to Nirvana. In the terminology of the Mahayanist, he must pursue the Bodhisattva course as best he can.

Buddhism has been aptly likened to a colossal edifice with many portals suitable for different types of men. The Noble Way is the difficult path, running through a mountainous region of rugged peaks and dark valleys. It is full of healthy adventure and beautiful scenery for the sturdy mountaineers who choose that way; but not all of the pilgrims of life possess such robust souls. Many are of a delicate constitution. Must Buddhism leave these behind as beyond hope of redemption?

Moral excellence is insisted upon in the Buddha's teaching as an indispensable condition of progress towards Nirvana, but some sects to-day enjoin it rather as an expression of gratitude. For example, the Pure Land School of Mahayana Buddhism, while according the highest reverence and praise to all who have attained enlightenment, or who strive for it, by following the Noble Way, refuses to admit virtuous living as being absolutely essential to the realization of perfect knowledge, or, as they prefer to express it, to birth in the Buddha Country of Amitabha. This attitude is not to be taken as implying any disregard or scorn for moral perfection or good deeds. On the contrary, the Pure Land sects (so called by way of contrast to the Shōdō-mon or "Gate of the Noble Way") encourage virtue as the noblest expression of gratitude to the Buddha of Eternal Life and Immeasurable Light—Amitabha—whom they look up to as their Saviour. No other offering, they believe, not even the greatest material sacrifice imaginable, can ever equal that of a life well lived in a thankful spirit.

If, then, a virtuous life is not to be their means of attaining eternal bliss, but only a token of their gratitude, how are the followers of these sects to obtain that bliss? By putting complete faith in Amitabha Buddha. According to the sutras recited daily by the Pure Land sects, Amitabha (then called Dharma-kara), while he was yet a *bhiksu*, determined to spend kalpas in Gargantuan self-denying service, that he might accumulate enough merit to be able to construct a paradise or Pure Land of his own, thither to welcome all deserving ones and also all who should have perfect faith in him. But faith or trust is a condition that cannot always be evoked at will, and this psychological fact renders this creed, called by its advocates the "Easier Way," often really more difficult of acceptance than the so-called "Difficult Way" of self-reliance.

St. Hōnen (1133–1212 A. D.), founder of the Jōdo-shū sect in Japan, taught concentration upon, and repetition of, the holy name of Amitabha Buddha (*Amida Butsu* in Japanese) as the chief means of securing this faith for oneself. His disciple, St. Shinran (1173–1262), who, after his teacher's death, founded a new sect of his own called the Jōdo-shin-shū, took a further bold step away from the path of works by declaring even this repetition of the holy name—*Nembutsu*—to be unnecessary. Not that he discouraged *Nembutsu* altogether; he only held that it was not indispensable to the gaining of pure faith in Amitabha, inasmuch as, in his view, Amitabha himself inspires this very faith in those who are in need of it. Here, then, we have a religion of pure faith which, though it claims to be based on the teachings of Gautama Buddha as embodied in certain of the sutras, bears a striking, albeit perhaps a superficial, resemblance to the Roman Catholic branch of Christianity.

But Shinran went farther than his teacher, not merely in the free interpretation of the sutras, but in his very mode of life. At the recommendation of Hōnen, Shinran abandoned celibacy and had a home and family, though he continued to call himself a priest, a member of the Sangha. Shinran, however, was not indifferent to rules of daily conduct. Not only did he encourage *Nembutsu* as a spontaneous expression of thankfulness, but he even formulated, for the communal life of his followers, rather strict rules, now known as the "Seventeen Articles of Prohibition". In his letters to his pupils, too, both priests and laymen, he dwelt frequently on the value of good behaviour and on the duty of all believers in Amitabha to lead clean, unselfish lives. Nevertheless, Shinran was no moralist in the ordinary sense. Like his master, Hōnen, he never wearied of assuring his pupils and friends of the boundless mercy of Amitabha, who had made his wonderful vow to find a way of deliverance even for those commonly looked upon as the most incorrigible of sinners.

Naturally, this creed was denounced by the traditional schools of

Buddhism as doing violence to the cardinal principles upon which those schools were founded, and specially as being calculated to produce the most adverse effects on the morals of the people. And indeed, this objection is still often raised against the tenets of the Pure Land sects, and, from the viewpoint of utilitarian ethics, the objection may be valid. But the exponent of that creed contends that the self-righteous man is the hardest to help, because pride stands in the way of spiritual awakening. It is the humble man, keenly conscious of his shortcomings, who, by his very humility of heart, opens his mind to the voice of Eternal Truth and so wins his way to lasting beatitude. "Who that is truly conscious of his own sins and sincerely repentant of them," he asks, "will coolly persist in committing more, even though he be assured of divine forgiveness, or told that no effort for atonement is demanded of him? On the other hand, what supreme magnanimity, what infinite mercy, is exemplified by the struggle of Dharma-kara Bhiksu (afterwards Amitabha Buddha) to save all beings that come to him for succour, barring always those who commit the Five Deadly Sins, or speak evil of the Good Law!" No one who meditates upon such superhuman compassion, he believes, can fail to be uplifted to ever higher planes of moral excellence.

The life histories of Hōnen and Shinran, master and disciple, who in a sense revolutionized Japanese Buddhism, have much in common. Hōnen lost his father at the tender age of eight, while Shinran, fatherless at three, became an orphan when only seven years old. One was a warrior's son; the other the son of a nobleman. Both joined the priesthood before they were ten years old and spent a number of years in monastic life. Both obtained positions of dignity on Mt. Hiyei, but became disgusted with the hypocritical mock-asceticism of monasteries. They had too great humility to think themselves worthy of deliverance through the disciplinary life which they had undertaken; and seeking a way of refuge and relief, they found it in the doctrine of faith in Amitabha. Both master and pupil were denounced by their opponents as traitors to the school they had forsaken, and were banished, by official decree, to provinces remote from the capital, though both were pardoned later and allowed to return to Kyoto before their death. Their respective sects are still flourishing to-day, though that of Shinran, in spite of many schisms, is much more prosperous and influential than the sect inaugurated by his master Hōnen.

MASATOSHI GENSEN MORI

MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

[**Dr. K. C. Varadachari** has lectured to various colleges of the Madras University on Indian Philosophy. As to his literary work, he tells us that since 1929, "being more interested in discovering a way of life I had resisted from writing for the journals, and now I thought I could break the self-imposed silence." He is at present occupied in working out "a synthesis of Vedantic and mystical thought".—EDS.]

It is a well-established fact that philosophy in early times was the business of the religious. It was an intellectual statement of the nature of the world, a statement that had its origin in their realization of Spirit or Reality. In other words, it was an intellectual restatement of what they knew in Spirit. Such an intellectual restatement was not satisfactory to those who worked entirely on the intellectual plane of thought. To them intuitive knowing was primitive, poetic, psychological, subjective; as against the objective definiteness of intellectual thought. Thus the philosophy of the religious was forced to yield its place to the philosophy of the intellectual. Instead of philosophy becoming an intellectual restatement of intuitively realized truth, it became the philosophy of intellect which relied entirely upon the senses for its facts. It finally became a philosophy of the intellect (or logic), divested from spiritual value and life, and divorced from the objective world of sensations; for its way was abstraction from them in order to discover their interrelations.

Thus it is that all present philosophizing, when strictly intellectual, moves along mathematical and physical lines towards grander and greater constructions of the world. The men who have a hearing these days are Sir James Jeans and Einstein. Their constructions, marvellous and titanic in their range, are of the abstract kind, in which the individual sinks into nothingness—a matter of utter insignificance to them, but a fact of infinite importance to true religion. Wrestling with formulae and scientific phraseology, philosophy seems to get some meaning and life.

But does it? Can a painted figure reveal the throb of youth? Can brilliant explorations of material structures lead to the understanding of value and meaning? Philosophy, so long as it confines itself to an inductive treatment of objective facts, can lead to nothing except a static idealism—an abstraction—or to an equally irrational materialism (realism).

If we make our approach through mere principles of identity and causality (which is supremely the way of equational science which has set the pace for modern philosophy), we end either in abstractions or in contradictictions.* If we prefer pluralism and recognize the many, we find ourselves in a world

* Cf. Emile Meyerson, *Identity and Reality*, p. 252.

of interconnected formulae of the mathematics of space and time to which all phenomena may be reduced. To make it still more real, however, we can even deify space-time as capable of having an end.* In all these efforts of philosophers, absolutistic or pluralistic, we behold a phantom structure, wherefrom life has fled and in which individual existence has no meaning. Rightly and trenchantly has it been expressed that these moderns who cater to absolutistic and pluralistic fantasies are "unrealists," irrational philosophers who, in ruling out the individual, rule out the supreme factor relevant to their study.

A geographical planning of interconnections in the internally distinguished Absolute of Bosanquet, no less than Jeans's speculative tabulation of physical and galactic myriads in infinite-finite space, or even the excellent researches in the configurative physical chemistry of matter, only leads to abstract materialism. This is the natural consummation of intellectual metaphysics. When Dr. Radhakrishnan summarises the results of the Western intellectual constructions and passes judgment, he is fully aware of the initial defect of all intellectual speculation. Even he should agree that the much looked for and anxiously explored "triumph over scholasticism" cannot take place unless and until there is an orientation of consciousness from its objective phase.

Intellect, by promising objectivity to its metaphysical constructions, devoured everything by making them fictions. Matter escaped through the meshes of the categorical constructions, and intellect despite its lameness tried to fashion a Hegelian movement in thought, to simulate the movement in life. Reality having refused to repeat the dialectic throbs of Hegel was felt to be something "more". Hegel's metaphysics, even when modified by the Italians Croce and Gentile, refused to make the history of the concrete and the particular, and remained and remain but an intellectual construction—a scheme through which Reality *ought* to flow. Only reality overflowed! Bradley was aware of the utter futility of intellectual schemes, and counselled a "more". Thus the finest master of intellectual thought came out with a confession of his failure to plot out reality. Philosophy came to a halt —it had become impossible.

Synchronous with this confession, there was a revolt against all intellect. Constructions of irrational systems became plentiful. Intuition, an old word, with sufficiently vague meaning, plastic and spiritual, was borrowed from the archives of ancient thinkers. This mystic and romantic word was a charm to conjure with. It *must* grasp the "more". Endowed with superintellectual powers and "spiritual energy," it could do the work of intellect more wisely. It knew the "more," it could construct the "more". But a new species of thinkers, psychologists, who had

* Prof. S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity.*

ntered laboratories to demonstrate the actions of the mind in n objective manner, protested. Man, they said, has not been understood. It may be that intellect has ailed in its attempt to know. However, there is no need to bring n a new entity till the least known ntity has been completely demonstrated to be incapable of doing he work required of it. New nonaboratory methods are unscienific. "Let mystics come in when sychologists fail."

Vitalism, psycho-analysis, and reative evolutionism began interpreting the world. They sketched he world of evolution. Intellect dissected experience and looked at it y arresting its movement or withdrawing it from its place in the rocess. The "more," the X, was lso here. The group spoke of it vith awe and spiritual reverence. The whole make-up of man, his dreams, emotions, sensations, intellect, personality, all these were 'explained" with the aid of intelectual instruments, now modified o suit the circumstances. But the heory of emergency in evolution rested entirely on objective experience, covering innumerable cases within and without the laboratory, for objects now included the subective, such as dreams and imagiations. All thought was focused on states of consciousness, and the permanent behind the changing became a nullity. Whilst Hume said that the permanent behind the changing is a myth, Bergson expressed the same positively as "Spirit is Change," recalling the great Heraclitean dictum. Thus to catch change with intellectual instruments however modified is impossible; to snatch is to distort, to make it unreal. One should live instead to understand, feel internally and sympathetically and be holy. Bergson more than anyone else challenged the intellect. All moderns are more or less followers of Bergson. To have shown not only that intellect cannot understand life, cannot represent it correctly, but that it positively distorts reality, is his greatest contribution. He gave excellence to Life and redeemed it.

Close on the heels of Bergson came the Modern Realists who hold that there must be some kind of real relation between change (or process) and Reality. The features of their thought in general are that this reality emerges constantly in and through change or process. For reality to be, it must be process; the values of reality can be and are exemplified only in its process, wherein each event is a unique and valuable feature of the Reality. In so far as an intellectual interpretation of individual events is concerned, they may be considered to be eternal forms, relations, or configurations. As to their being mental or material, they may be (Russell) neuter, a third type which like the hermaphrodite may change its sex this way and that. Thus by accepting the emotional, imaginal and process character of reality, the realists gave back life to philosophy; intellect was forced to accept an equal share, but not the whole share; and Bergson's effort was

not wasted, though not fulfilled.

Thus life was restored, but where was value? The dogmatic assertion of value of the Absolute was followed by a more insistent dogmatism of the *élan vital* and the self-identical entities. The individual Life has nowhere been included in the survey; rather it has been sacrificed. For that is Western philosophy. Philosophy's inveterate search for cosmic order has made it impossible for it to uphold the significance of each individual. And all philosophical Religion is at bottom objectively bent, dependent upon the quantity of external experience. If philosophy experiences "religion," the Nous, the "noumenal" consciousness, it is that awe and wonder which, undoubtedly, as Rudolf Otto says, compose religious consciousness, but which, however, are not themselves religion.

There is an element in religion of which the psychological attempt can be least aware, the internal experience of an integral "moreness" proceeding from the subject, not from the object. It is not an element of the experience of the weird expanse of the starry heavens, or even the frightening grandeur of its beauty. It is the inner experience of true creative delight, which, because it is integral, is "more" than any state of experience subjective or objective. Psychological laboratory methods may gain some knowledge of the strange worlds of "beyond body" or death, and even know and experiment upon the powers of the mind, but can never know this through objective search in test tubes and galvanometers.

All modern philosophy is materialism in a sense. It seeks the knowledge of extension and relationship with the many; it seeks an order, not value, whatever be the value of the experience of order. Value is of the individual and proceeds from the subject, a self, not a series of states. Religion is truly of the individual. It seeks the value of the individual. Its knowledge is truly of the self. Nor should the self be considered to be anything which may be seen by the eye, heard by the ear; from it everything proceeds. The rest are merely series of states.

Idealism is right when it strives to know the order through the subjective consciousness, but the subject of idealism unfortunately is James's superficial continuity of consciousness or Hume's isolated states, suffused with feeling. Indian idealism, on the other hand, dared to go behind the states of consciousness and instead of viewing the states as objective effects, knew them as subjective configurations of the self behind. Hence all Western idealism ends in scepticism and materialism (abstractionism), whilst Indian idealism triumphs over materialism and ends in religion which discovers the value and meaning of the individual.

K. C. VARADACHARI

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE UNDISCOVERED BOURNE*

[**E. F. Benson** has ranked for many years as a novelist of distinction. He comes of a family noted for its literary ability.

It is taken for granted, for which there is no warrant, that at the dawn of civilization humanity was composed of savages. A careful comparative study of the earliest texts, *e. g.*, the Vedas of India, the Papyri of Egypt, etc., reveal that the ancients did possess knowledge now lost to us. Among other things they knew the nature of man psychical and spiritual as well as physical, and the state of his various constituents after the death of the body. As Mr. Benson points out, in this book we have facts of the experiences of its sincere author which we can accept, but where are the explanations which satisfy? We say, search the Wisdom of the Ancients.—EDS.]

Mrs. de Crespigny's book deserves to be read with the respect we must always accord to the work of an author, whether or no we agree with his conclusions, who writes of his subject with such sincerity and conviction. It takes the form of a psychical autobiography, and its general scope is to relate how from being a complete sceptic she became, owing to certain experiences here set forth, a whole-hearted believer in spiritualism. Mrs. de Crespigny defines spiritualism as having for its main aim the proof that the human spirit survives the death of the body, retains its individuality and the consciousness of its life on earth, and, by means of 'mediums," can communicate with friends and relations, thus testifying to its continued existence. To most of us, perhaps because we have not sufficient knowledge of the subject, these communications do not seem to have as yet established definite proof, but any open-minded person must read such manifestations as are here related with intense interest.

The subject is of enormous significance. If it can be proved that the human spirit after death passes on to a new phase of individual existence, with the same certainty as we can prove that water, when subjected to a fixed degree of cold, becomes ice, it may safely be said that no scientific discovery of any age approaches this in importance; the sting of death would vanish, and the miseries and raptures of our brief human life on earth, apparently distributed with so fortuitous a hand, would seem of small account. But, in order to be certain that these communications actually come from the other side of the grave, we must rule out all instances in which natural laws or a reasonable extension of them could provide an explanation. If, for example, a medium tells a sitter facts concerning the dead which are already known to him, this cannot be taken as evidential,

* *This World and Beyond.* By MRS. PHILIP CHAMPION de CRESPIGNY. (Cassell and Co., Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

for telepathy, our knowledge of which is still in its infancy, might conceivably account for such a communication. I do not see how it would cover all the experiences which Mrs. de Crespigny relates, and these are of extreme interest to everybody.

Mrs. de Crespigny's theories to account for some of these supernormal phenomena are not so convincing as her statement of them. She gives us a very remarkable story of a *poltergeist* (that "intelligence" which throws furniture about in a baffling but idiotic manner) which she personally experienced. But when she tells us that "Feda," Mrs. Leonard's control, informed her that all physical phenomena of the sort are produced from the other side "by what you would call navvies," who sometimes go out on strike (in which case there are no manifestations at *séances*), we feel unconvinced. Again, she admits that a medium in trance may hold forth in a very boring and platitudinous manner, but her explanation that such an address "appears to be the tiresome self-exploitation of some self-centred would-be orator in the other world, who, failing to induce anyone to listen to him in that sphere, dumps his pious platitudes and tedious exhortations on long-suffering audiences in this," is an unsupported assumption. Sometimes we find ourselves in frank disagreement with her. Certain people, she tells us, claim to have had direct communication with Christ himself. This she says is impossible "for the rate and power of the attendant vibrations would be absolutely disintegrating to any physical body on so low a level as the earth". But how can this be? When Christ was incarnate on the earth He did not disintegrate those with whom He associated. He bade them take His yoke upon them, and He healed the sick.... Again she accounts for the curious fact that a very large percentage of well-known mediums are women by suggesting that Adam being formed out of the dust, according to one version of the creation of man in Genesis, was "matter without modification," and did not afford a suitable medium for the functioning of spirit. That is hardly satisfactory, and becomes even less so when she adds "in terms of to-day," that "the gaps between the wave-lengths were too wide to make any form of synchronization possible between spirit in its higher forms and matter".

But when Mrs. de Crespigny comes to her experiences, we listen, we read entranced. Outstanding among them is one concerning a "fire medium," Mrs. Annie Hunter, who, when under the control of an ancient fire-worshipper, could handle with impunity live coals or other incandescent matter. On this occasion a log was put on the fire, and turned about till all the surface was burning embers. Mrs. Hunter then went into trance and took this log from the fire and passed it from one hand to the other. The log was then re-heated several times and, at the medium's invitation, Mrs. de Crespigny picked

t up in her bare hand and carried t about till her hand should have been burned to the bone, but emained unsinged and unreddened. All this passed in broad daylight, nd three witnesses testified to the iteral truth of it. Whether Mrs. le Crespigny is right in attributing er immunity from burning to the unction of an "etheric sheath" hat protected her hand is almost beside the point. The phenomenon was well-supported by recorded evidence, and the only conclusion s that some law, unknown to us, ntervened.

"Faith is the substance of things noped for," and no excursion into uncharted realms, whether physcal or psychical can progress a single step without it. It is for this reason that Mrs. de Crespigny's book is valuable, for it is the psychical history of one who continually pushed forward in the sure expectation of finding. Quite early in the history of civilization man conceived the notion of the survival of the spirit after death, but this appears to be not so much a venture of faith as his inability to conceive of annihilation. Centuries later, Socrates, one of the most enlightened of philosophical speculators, discoursing to his disciples an hour or two before, at sunset, the executioner brought him the lethal draught, spoke of conscious survival as being about an even chance. Perhaps he would go through death into life, perhaps an eternal and dreamless sleep awaited him. Others, like Saul, consulting the witch of Endor, thought that spells could raise the dead. Since then science has made huge inroads into the domain of superstition: witchcraft has paled before the sunrise of fresh discoveries of natural law; but, as far as science is concerned, the conundrum concerning a future life still broods, like pavilions of dark water, over the coasts of the unknown. It is into these darknesses that pioneers like Mrs. de Crespigny are penetrating. Mirages and plausible spectres, not very strictly investigated, may perhaps seem more real than they are, and faith is the only lantern, shining like a lighthouse over perilous seas.

E. F. Benson

In his paper before the International Philosophical Congress on "Contacts and Conflicts of Eastern and Western Philosophies" Professor G. P. Conger says:—

"In the West we now have vigorous psychologies which bring incisive critiques of mysticism, which have little or no confidence in intuitionism, and which, although compelled to acknowledge the uniqueness of mind, do not recognize its priority or supremacy. Studies in logic indicate the aptness of mind, but not its ubiquity. Epistemological discussions about mind and the world are inconclusive, and perhaps gain nothing which is not tacitly assumed at the outset. The result is that while the assumption of a Cosmic Mind may still be made, the difficulties appear from the Western side more and more formidable."

MYSTICISM: NATURAL VERSUS SPIRITUAL

[These two contributions treat of the problem of natural and spiritual mysticism about which Mr. D. L. Murray wrote in our pages for August 1932. The first is from the pen of a Westerner, **Mr. J. S. Collis**; the second from that of an Indian, **Mr. Saroj Kumar Das**. Both articles are based on the views propounded by Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset.—EDS.]

I.—WORDSWORTHIAN PANTHEISM

The work of Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset has always been important, and becomes increasingly more so. His work is *modern* and does not belong either to pre-War Utopianism or to post-War despair. He is one of the very few who see in the War something not only terrible but hopeful—a climax of selfishness, an explosion of individualism, clearing the way for a more selfless era. In his hands literary criticism is nothing less than religion, philosophy and psychology drawn together dynamically. Unless literary criticism aims at that, it is not very important. But few critics are capable of the task; Middleton Murry was capable of it but has given it up; so Fausset has the field very nearly to himself. He gives his undivided attention to the science of growth. His work fulfils the hope put forward by General Smuts in his *Holism and Evolution* that a New Biography would appear and deal with the achievement of Personality and the making of the Soul. This has always been Fausset's aim. The development, the discord, the inner drama of a Tolstoy, a Coleridge, a Keats has always been his theme. In *The Proving of Psyche* he gathered together his view in the form of an attack on Humanism, in which he insisted all the time that the religious life is an *art* and cannot submit itself to humanists like Professor Babbitt in America—or, he might have added, like Gandhi in India. Only those who are unfamiliar with moralists and humanists will fail to realise that this means a relentless fight against dualism and an incessant championing of monism. Nor is that all; it means holding up Imagination as the faculty of apprehension that points to the best method of advance.

In *The Lost Leader* Mr. Fausset addresses himself to the same problems with even greater skill than before. This book of his is remarkable; it has so very much in it that I must confine myself severely within the limits of its essential theme. The tragedy of Wordsworth, according to Mr. Fausset and to all who regard his life as a tragedy, is that not only did he not grow forward, he degenerated. And if we hold that there is nothing in life more precious than growth we must consider the life of Wordsworth tragic indeed.

We have no record of a happier childhood and adolescence having been spent on earth. It was perfect—he had perfect parents, a perfect schooling, a perfect sister,

a perfect brother, and perfect environment. These fantastically marvellous gifts were given to a boy fantastically suited to receive them. There never was such a boy! A few readings of the *Prelude* convinces one that here in Westmoreland something unique had occurred. Here, in this place, amongst these mountains, a *perfect* human being roamed for many years: a child, a boy, a youth, a young man at one with himself, at one with Nature. There are no words strong enough to convey such unity. He was as much a piece of Nature, as innocent and undivided as a daffodil or a deer. But he was much more than an animal; he was conscious of his joy in nature; his ecstatic touch with life solved all problems for him—neither death, nor deity, nor evil perturbed him in the least.

Life has a way of exacting payment for too much happiness as often as in rewarding too much suffering. While reading *The Prelude* we feel that Wordsworth later will have to pay for such a childhood—the transition into manhood will be more difficult for him than for any other. And pay he did. *He failed to make the transition successfully from his instinctive faith in Nature to the conscious faith in which the intellect plays so great a part.* His destiny as a human being forced him into intellectuality—he couldn't help it—but he was not favoured by the gods in the second stage. He was too strong intuitively for his inferior intellect. He never used his mind to advantage. Mr. Fausset states that so tremendous was his youthful joy among the hills that "he could hardly credit nature with destructive force". And the author draws attention to a passage when the poet speaks of the Cross at La Grande Chartreuse which "The storm full surely reverenced". The passage is quoted to exemplify "the credulity in his worship of Nature for which he was to pay bitterly enough". We cannot help feeling that Mr. Fausset is here stretching a point too far—Wordsworth could not have been blind to the destructive forces of nature. Nevertheless the essential fact about him is that he did not succeed in erecting a satisfactory philosophy based on his gigantic intuitive joys. He was at the mercy of sensation.

At the mercy of sensation. It is necessary to be sure of our ground here—at any rate, honest and sincere. The Editors of this Periodical, commenting in October 1932 on an article by Mr. Fausset on Wordsworth, wrote:—

> Not only excuses are made but explanations are offered justifying the sense-indulgence and even sense-orgies of creative artists—a view not acceptable to Yoga-Vidya or Occultism.

I am anxious not to evade the issue here. It seems to me a question of avoiding extremities. We must have sensation. We must start with sensation. Because we must start with experience. The opening words of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* provide the formulation which many of us must find corresponds exactly with our own and only method of advance.

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses?

Then he adds:—

But, though all our knowledge begins *with* experience, it by no means follows that all arises *out of* experience.

I perceive an object of Nature and experience a feeling of joy: this experience and intuition, *creatively understood*, can lead me ultimately to the grace of vision. If it is not creatively understood, it will not lead me anywhere. What is got *out of* the experience depends upon Imagination, upon "Reason in her most exalted mood". But I do not see how we can get on without sensation.

Wordsworth had overwhelming intuitions of the *numinous*. But he was incapable of erecting a philosophy of living out of his experience. In consequence he was always at the mercy of his sensations; and his sensations were literally at the mercy of his geographical position. So long as he was in a place where Nature smiled on him, all was well; but when he was somewhere where Nature did not inspire him, he was terrified, feeling, *I have lost my faith*. Mr. Aldous Huxley has written an essay suggesting that had Wordsworth visited the Indian Tropics his enraptured view of Nature would have been undermined, and he would have been overcome with horror instead of joy. This is no doubt true, for he had only to go as far as Germany in the cold winter to be utterly cast down. Mr. Fausset makes it abundantly clear that his pantheism was not a thorough pantheism, for he never learnt to accept life in its fullness, nor suffering, nor death. His was not a real mysticism nor a real pantheism but was simply "love of nature" when nature was easy to love. But to suggest, as Huxley does, that a true mystic and pantheist is in any more danger of losing his vision in a jungle than in a bluebell wood in England, is absurd. The difference between those two places is one of degree only. In both there is beauty, in both struggle, suffering and death. In both the pantheist must accept the at first frightful thought that God exists by a process of eating Himself. And in both there is really only one solution: to accept the scene with vision and in humility and without personal anxiety. To find an expression of such acceptance we turn immediately to Emerson who, echoing the *Bhagavad-Gita*, cried:—

If the red slayer thinks he slays,
And if the slain thinks he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.

The weakness of Wordsworth's pantheism and of much Western pantheism is that it is sentimental and sensational and not thorough. It is superficial because Nature in the West is superficially more attractive. It is in the East, in the Tropics, that we find the profoundest expressions of pantheism which teach, logically and scientifically, a philosophy of life in which the individual's task is to

identify himself with the cosmic growth. The theme, fully sustained, of Mr. Fausset's significant book is to show how Wordsworth in not knowing how to identify himself with the cosmic growth after his maturity, on longer felt at home in the universe, and looked towards other worlds and a transcendent God. He shows how Wordsworth wanted to take the adventure of Love but was held back by his prudence, his anxiety, his egoism, his stubbornness, and his pride. He believed in Love as the key, but he was cut off from understanding the ultimate fashion of Love.

Wordsworth is one of our greatest champions of Imagination, of "Reason in her most exalted mood," of Intellectual Love rising from Intuition. He speaks of "the deep lesson of Love" which he,

> Whom Nature, by whatever means, has taught
> To feel intensely, cannot but receive.

And of the days gone by he cries:—

> O then how beautiful, how bright, appeared
> The written promise!

But we have to ask, how was it that the lesson of love did so little for him when he needed it most, how came it that he was for ever intent upon *recapturing* that sense of miraculous promise, and wrote his best work out of the agony of what he had *lost*? Mr. Fausset replies that he was poisoned by prudence and by fear. He points out the stultifying evasion in his Principle of Love. It was far too safe a love. You are to love, he says, in *The Excursion*, such objects as excite

> No morbid passions, no disquietude,
> No vengeance, and no hatred.

There lies the essential weakness of Wordsworth—the incompleteness of his love and the incompleteness of his thought. Just as he was at the mercy of his geographical situation, likewise he dared not contemplate any objects that he might not instinctively like. But real love is infinitely more complete and leads to a complete philosophy. It endureth all things, it suffereth all things, and is still kind. And more, it sees Beauty where few see her; where, perhaps, none else can see her. But the exercise of that love calls for an acceptance of life and for a renunciation of selfish anxiety.

Mr. Fausset makes it plain that prudence, fear, pride, and self-regard undermined Wordsworth's imagination and love. At one time he had faith in Nature, he had faith in the perfectibility of Man, and faith in himself. But because he did not creatively and courageously face and understand his faithful intuitions and grew to be afraid of his self-abandonment, Life in the end abandoned him and he lost all that he had hoped to save. From the marvellous youth who received overwhelming intimations of the *numinous*,of the divine, of the self-sufficing, utterly unintelligible but obviously trustworthy universe, to the man who complained through the mouth of the Solitary that he could find no *assurance* whatsoever in Nature; from the idealist who assisted at the French Revolution to the conservative who urged war and slaughter against France—

there is the most extraordinary division.

Wordsworth has given us what are probably the most gorgeous expressions of pantheism in the literature of the world. It takes away something of the force of Mr. Fausset's volume when we fully realise that these expressions were due to the poet's inability to make the best of his experience. We are glad he was thus foolish and thus frustrated and thus destined; and in so far as the author laments over a lost leader he misses a final profundity. But his book has a deeper claim to our attention. He rightly sees in Wordsworth a severe symbol of the pilgrimage of the human race. We are now far enough on in history to see that that pilgrimage should be from primitive consciousness when men lived in a state of unconscious animism, to the inbreak of the intellect when individuality, selfishness, dualism and discord finally lead to a third stage when men shall live in a state of conscious monism, and the purged intellect shall be presided over by Imagination. Wordsworth illustrates the first stage with amazing fidelity, and his Fall into the second stage, from which he did not emerge, is equally striking. He teaches us by his own burning example what *not* to do in order to reach the third stage. And what, according to Mr. Fausset, should be done, the affirmative spirit required for making towards that third stage, is the theme of his remarkable study.

J. S. COLLIS

II.—A PILGRIM OF THE MYSTIC WAY

If the universe is, in the ultimate analysis, "the vale of soul-making," Hugh I'Anson Fausset is undoubtedly a mystic in the making—a prophet of the New Humanism. Apart from the autobiographical interest of his search "for a true religion of the Spirit," recorded in *A Modern Prelude,* his commentary on his personal experience has a universality of appeal.

Although all mystics speak the same language, their accents differ. The mystic way is not a standardised one suitable for all alike—the *sādhanā* of every mystic having an individuality all its own. Indeed, this is just the point in human nature where individualism is at its strongest and deserves to be cherished as a priceless legacy. Hence it is altogether futile to search for a common measure of mystic disciplines (*sādhanā*), when there is no common measure of minds. As a matter of fact the mystics themselves have no preconception of the way that is pursued by them: they are truly people that live forwards but understand backwards. Under the controlling lead of Spirit—the *Atman*—of a fullness lying within, the mystics carve out their respective pathways to the blessed goal of mystical

llumination. That being the case, t is unnecessary to enquire whether Mr. Fausset's "progress through he conflicts and disillusionments of egoism towards the unity of a eal self-hood" fits in with the raditional stratification of the nystical Life into the Purgative, he Illuminative, and the Unitive tage.

Perhaps no word in the whole ange of English literature has been more grossly abused than 'mysticism". But this degradation surely belies the original purity and sanctity associated with the etymological meaning of the word. Without trying to trace its antiquity, all that we may conveniently note here is that it had already acquired currency among the Greeks, specially in connection with the Dionysian and Eleusinian Mysteries, when it was taken over and popularised by the Neo-Platonists. The name "*Mystēs*" applied to "one initiated" or a priest of secret rites of divine worship. We can usefully compare the Sanskrit word "Upanishad," which, as derived from the stem "sad" (= to sit) with the prefixes of "Upa" and "Ni," means etymologically "that which is imparted to the (initiated) disciple when he sits close to his preceptor"—hence, "a secret doctrine or mystery," *Parā Vidyā* or Esoteric Wisdom. The word *mystērion* in Greek is, again, cognate with *muein*, meaning "closing of lips or eyes"—perhaps as being symbolic and suggestive of withdrawal of the senses from their natural outgoing activity in the world and their concentration within. This is astonishingly similar to the literal as well as symbolic meaning of *avritta-chakshuḥ* or " closed eyes " that we have in the opening verse of the second chapter of the *Katha Upanishad.*

With the derivative meaning of the word as a lever to raise it from its degrading associations, it is not difficult to differentiate it clearly from its past as well as present-day aberrations. In the first place, the association of mysticism with the acquisition of certain occult powers has been construed, from the standpoint of spiritual realisation, whether in the East or in the West, as the betrayal of the spiritual task. Secondly, mystical experiences are not to be indiscriminately classed with "pathological" phenomena and thus explained away merely as cases of auto-suggestion or self-hypnotization. Things may not after all be what they seem, and in fact may differ from what they seem by the whole diameter of being. Finally, in view of the eroto-mania which has seized the modern psycho-analysts in their typical attempt to account for "the whole choir of heaven and the entire furniture of earth" as cases of Freudian "complex," it is of extreme urgency and importance, in the interest of scientific study itself, to stand up in "defence of a philosophic doubt" which stoutly refuses to cater to a popular craze or pay homage to the "Idols of the Market-place". Such an attitude of suspense of judgment is the more necessary as one is confronted with the task of inter-

preting mystical experiences.

Mysticism is not a creed, doctrine or dogma, but is an art—the almost "lost art of worship". Hence its value is largely, if not wholly, practical. Indeed, Mysticism is religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form: it is religion viewed from within. With a truly prophetic insight Mr. Fausset announces his solution of the "Modern Dilemma": "What, therefore, we need to-day most is to cultivate a true inwardness." (*The Modern Dilemma*, p. 16) And from "the sustained depth of his self-knowledge"—for "all true knowledge is necessarily self-knowledge" (*Ibid.*, p. 18)—will yet emerge for the modern man "the true religion of the Spirit".

On this track of endless pilgrimage *The Modern Dilemma* serves as the conning-tower from the top of which Mr. Fausset commands a full survey of the situation that confronts the modern man. His reading of it is as accurate as it is appalling: we are in the tentacled grip of a steadily increasing mechanisation of life and its values.

> Standardization, with its levelling effects, is everywhere apparent, so that not only motor cars and objects of use are assuming a uniform appearance, but human beings are more and more conforming to type, which may be physically and mentally efficient, but which lacks individual expressiveness or soul. (*Ibid.*, pp. 2–3)

This has for its necessary counterpart a morbid "individualism," which has been taught to seize individuality on the wrong side—as a "finished and finite clod untroubled by a spark" of ideality. It is no wonder that this superstitious idolatry of personality has led to a "self-assertion" which "is not only being generally practised, but is being preached as a gospel" (p. 3). In this respect the original sin lies with the Renaissance, "the index of the modern Western World. For it is from the Renaissance that we may date the pronounced emergence of critical and self-conscious individualism" (p. 5).

The canker that is eating into the very vitals of modern life is, as Mr. Fausset correctly diagnoses, the direct legacy of the Renaissance mentality that liberated and made an apotheosis of the intellectual impulse. To quote his very words on the point:—

> Knowledge pursued as an end in itself, instead of as a means to self-knowledge and the good life, and the brain exercised as an end in itself instead of as the means to an enriched and heightened consciousness, have not only disturbed throughout the world the whole order of human mentality, but impoverished or even paralysed the soul. And by the soul I mean that organic singleness of being, that creative core in which all the faculties of an individual should be centred, through which he acts in accord with the universal principle of life, and without which no one can be an individual in a really vital and inevitable sense. (pp. 46–47)

This "creative wholeness of being," represents

> a true reconciliation of heart and head in imaginative understanding, a true at-one-ment with the spiritual source and reality of all being, by virtue of which all nature is perceived as supernatural and the life of a flower is in its degree as beautiful and inevi-

able a mystery as the life of Jesus. pp. 26–27)

Mr. Fausset is convinced that the only way "to save the soul from mechanization" is "to subordinate both our rationalism and our ethics to æsthetic imagination" (*Ibid.*, p. 76). He has definitely rescued "imagination" from its position of obscurity, and invested it with a constitutive validity and importance. It means for him "a shaping spirit, which does not argue or analyse, but which disinterestedly creates what it perceives, and perceives what it creates" (p. 56); and like Keats, he closes this trend of reflection on the sublime note: "What the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth." (p. 81)

The "dominion of the Understanding" as divorced from Imagination has been the prolific source of all the distempers that the modern civilization is suffering from. To recover the creative integrity of our personal life from the domination of a divided consciousness—that has been the chief preoccupation of Mr. Fausset's writings. In *The Lost Leader: A Study of Wordsworth*, he endeavours to substantiate his main thesis with special reference to Wordsworth's mind and art. Mr. Fausset lays down that to discover

> how the rational and the instinctive may be creatively harmonised is ... the most fundamental problem which faces us to-day. And since the cardinal importance of Wordsworth is that he tried and failed to solve this problem as a man, although he came near solving it in moments of divination as a poet, he has, I believe, a very vital meaning for us to-day. (p. 11)

Wordsworth has a special appeal for him inasmuch as Mr. Fausset thinks that "No one shows more clearly than Wordsworth that the problem of reconciling the spiritual and the natural man is ultimately a problem of achieving a true individuality." (*loc. cit.*)

The same theme comes in for a negative justification in *Tolstoy: The Inner Drama.* Tolstoy interests him particularly because—

> he served humanity more notably as an indicter of a false civilisation than as the prophet of a true one, as the champion of a moral conception of human life than as the discoverer of a really creative morality. (p. 8)

But Mr. Fausset is convinced—

> that Tolstoy erred in his moral judgment only in so far as he was unable to realize that identity of moral and æsthetic values in which art and life may ultimately become one. (p. 8)
>
> We may observe in the growth of individuals and to a less degree in that of peoples three stages of Consciousness; the first primitive or animal, in which the self is still undifferentiated; the second self-conscious, in which the critical intelligence has separated itself from instinct; the third ideally human, in which intelligence is again reconciled with instinct as in the first stage but without a sacrifice of the individual consciousness achieved at the cost of dislocation in the second. (p. 15)

As against the aberrations of the sentimental cry of a "return to nature" or a "Renaissance of instinct," Mr. Fausset lays a justified emphasis on the point that "to sanctify the instinctive is as great an error as to sanctify the rational. The savage may be more natural,

may be more virtuous than the pseudo-civilised man, but he is further removed from the possibilities of a completely realized humanity" (p. 20). Although Tolstoy "erred in trying to divorce the spiritual from the physical, he thereby did a better service to mankind than by sentimentalizing animalism and calling it love, and sentimentalizing naturalism and calling it mysticism" (p. 24). Fortunately, however, "all his life he refused to conclude a sentimental peace between the two forces of his nature" without pretending "to reconcile them emotionally" (p. 25).

The dualistic or divided consciousness, then, has served only to intensify our miseries; and the way to redemption lies in the discovery of the plane of the Spiri above and beyond the plane of th Mind. *The Proving of Psyche* give the redemptive warning that "th Western world has reached a poin in its history when creative imagi nation is more necessary to it salvation than a critical ethic' (p. 192). The modern problem i one of "creative co-ordination,' demanding "the concentration necessary to true inwardness' (p. 144). Quoting with approval from Mr. Middleton Murry, he concludes:—

What we have to do is to regain the spontaneity of the animal or the child and sacrifice nothing of our human faculties. *This can be done.* This is the eternal re-birth which is the secret of true mysticism and of the teaching of Jesus himself. It and nothing else is the "mystery of the Kingdom of God"

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

Manifesto : The Book of the F. P. S. I. Ed. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.)

Mr. Joad apprehends that our civilisation is disintegrating and drifting towards destruction, and mankind seems to be incapable of averting the disaster. There are, however, some who do not despair of the Commonwealth, and believe that "reason still counts in human affairs". They are determined to "fight the sombre destiny that hangs over humanity". The present volume is the objective embodiment of their hopes and beliefs. Though addressed to readers in Great Britain, the work has a wider appeal. It is at once a declaration of faith, a programme of action, and an appeal to the scattered forces of world construction to close up their ranks and march in the common cause of humanity,

The basis of the "Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals," which the volume expounds, is comprehensive; in addition to the primary programme of world reorganisation, it includes a number of subsidiary reforms. Thus, it is contended that "in the sexual sphere the communal effort . . . [should be] confined . . . to the negative task of removing tyrannical coercions and destructive restrictions" based on "guess work, illusion, or superstition". The reform of Criminal Law should include the separation of the trial from the sentence :—

The task of allotting sentences should be entrusted to some persons selected for their experience of private life and administration, and their knowledge of the prison population, of social conditions, and of the causes of crime.

The State should be secularised not only to secure "for the individual the most complete freedom of conduct and

self-expression that is consistent with the common welfare," but also because it will "render possible a wholesale recasting of our legal system on a utilitarian basis". Town and country planning is advocated to embody "some graciousness in life's physical pattern".

The programme of subsidiary reforms will both command assent and rouse violent disagreement, but it does not stir the imagination as is the case with the proposals for the reconstruction of the economic and political framework of society. Economic reorganisation must seek to realise "the ideal economic condition, . . . in which every factor of production is most effectively employed to give the maximum human satisfaction in the supply of goods and service with the minimum demand upon the leisure of people". This can only be achieved by planning, but planning will have to be on a national basis, though the national Plan should be so framed "as to harmonise with an international system in which chaos of competition will give place to ordered economic co-operation between the peoples of the world".

International Co-operation, economic and political, is opposed by the glaring anachronism of the sovereign National State. Nations speak the language of Disarmament but tread the path of militarism. They "are like a lunatic family whose members starve themselves to fill their cellars with dynamite". But the madness will pass, and "presently, if not soon, the world Commonwealth will be founded sufficiently securely to ensure that wars between the nations of to-day are ruled out". How this is to be achieved is explained in some detail, but "our business now is to concentrate effort on securing for the first time a World Disarmament Treaty in which the armaments of the World will be recognised as the world's concern".

"The real obstacles are in men's minds," and the will to organise for peace, the will to cooperate for common welfare, is lacking. "At present the majority of human beings are mental cripples whose judgment and will have been distorted," among other causes, "by faulty education". Accordingly the problems of Education are reviewed rapidly, and education is visualised against a background of world Citizenship. "Education should turn every boy and girl in the world not only into a complete individual personality but also a good citizen of the World." The individual should be freed from clerical and militarist influences, and enabled "to play his part in the age-long adventure of humanity . . . to subordinate all lesser sentiments to the supreme sentiment of loyalty to the enterprise of the human species".

The volume is illumined, in Morley's noble phrase, by "the lamp of devotion to Reason," and it closes appropriately with an adjuration to the individual to fight against "the internal oppressors that enslave the human mind." The control of the conscious personality over the other elements in our mental life needs to be strengthened, so that the problems of life can be dealt with by reason and discrimination. In the battle of Kurukshetra that goes on in every human soul, the gospel of the *Gita* must triumph before the new era dawns on the world.

N. S. Subba Rao

A Search in Secret India. By PAUL BRUNTON, with a Foreword by Sir Francis Younghusband. (Rider and Co., London. 15s.)

Ever since the days of Apollonius of Tyana and even earlier, a few in the West have known and many have believed in the existence of the Wise Men of India. Out of India has come the wisdom of the ages and also the fantastic cults of a day. This book is a record of a search for those Wise Men made, apparently a few years ago, by an English journalist who, as he puts it, "combined within his complex nature the two elements of scientific scepticism and spiritual sensitivity".

Considering that he had to "cram investigations into a minimum time since he could not afford to spend years out of life upon a single quest," he has been singularly fortunate, for it is seldom to such impatient knockers that the gates of wisdom swing open. As it is, he has met many of the better known and some, too, of the less known sadhus and yogis of this country. To all these he went with his hard, but not ignoble, scepticism which, if it inevitably shut him out from some of the deeper things, yet enabled him to keep his balance amidst the mass of imposture and folly that lives parasitically upon the wisdom of the few and which has engulfed many and disgusted more.

Among those he met were a Hatha Yogi who demonstrated some remarkable physiological feats such as voluntary stoppage of the heart and breathing; Meher Bābā, the celebrated Parsi Messiah; Sri Shankarāchārya, the Pontiff of Kumbakonam Math and spiritual descendant of the great Shankara; Sāhabji Maharāj, the guru of the Rādhāswāmi sect, whose attempt to combine yoga with the running of a model industrial community aroused his admiration; Sudhei Babu, an astrologer of Benares who seriously shook his proud faith in free-will; Vishuddhānanda, the yogi of Benares, whose power of making magical scents out of the solar rays has been described by several writers; and, to pass over a number of other figures, some interesting, others amusing, the "Mahārishee," a saintly recluse living with his disciples in Arunachala in the South, whom our author visited early in his tour and to whom he came back in the end as "the one man who impressed me more than any other man I had ever met".

This sage, claiming no occult powers or hierophantic knowledge, impressed him profoundly and, despite barriers of language, his brief sojourn in the "sublime spirituality" of the Mahārishee's atmosphere brought him a spiritual experience which enabled him to leave India "quietly content because the battle for spiritual certitude had been won and won without sacrificing my dearly loved rationalism for a blind credulity".

Are these men the genuine Sages of whom tradition speaks? This question must be left for the reader to answer according to his own light. Different people have different ideas as to what constitutes a Mahatma, and will judge accordingly. One thing at least is certain, namely, that the book contains genuine accounts of remarkable men and should be sufficient to dispel the delusion that the wisdom and magic of the East are an empty legend traded on by knaves and believed in by fools.

One mistake, however, our author makes, and that is in speaking more than once of the Mahārishee as "one of the last of India's race of spiritual supermen". More than once, too, he voices the thought that the yoga is a dying science, the yogis, a dying race, destined, unless they descend from their mountain heights and take a more "practical" view of life, to inevitable extinction. "We shall roughly turn our heads away," he says, and India will follow suit. Perhaps so; perhaps not. Anyway, as Blake would have said, "Hear a plain fact!":—The Wisdom is Eternal and the Race of its Teachers lasts from Eternity to

Eternity. The insolent scepticism of the modern age can no more affect that Race than the making of an underground railway can affect the sun. The Yogi does descend from his world to ours but he does it at his own time, not at ours, and whether we "turn our heads roughly away" or not, though a matter of considerable consequence to us, is of no importance to him at all.

Our friend's values on this point are quite wrong. What he calls the "musty lore" of the East does not exist in order that Europeans, after "poking about," may "add a few pebbles of knowledge to our heap"! If this is all he has learnt from his sages then we can scarcely consider his search to have been very successful. Perhaps, however, these sentences are meant as mere concessions to contemporary folly. Let us therefore allow him to conclude in his own words:—

> What I did arrive at was a new acceptance of the Divine. This may seem quite an insignificant and personal thing to do but, as a child of this modern generation which relies on hard facts and cold reason and which lacks enthusiasm for things religious, I regard it as quite an achievement. This faith was restored in the only way a sceptic could have it restored, not by argument but by the witness of an overwhelming experience.

To this we need only add that if one wishes more than that he must emulate that merchant who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that he had and bought it.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

The Endless Quest—3000 Years of Science. By F. W. WESTAWAY. (Blackie & Son Ltd., London and Glasgow. 21s.)

No serious student denies that modern science has failed to explain the major problems pertaining to the origin and goal of life and of the Universe—the apologists of science taking shelter under the plea that it is not the function of science to deal with such matters! On the other hand an increasing number of men and women of culture find that the great sages and seers of yore successfully tackled the problems which science is finding insoluble. They therefore relegate science to a subordinate position, and derive their inspiration in life from the immemorial teachings which are to-day collectively known under the name of the Wisdom-Religion or Theosophy.

Mr. Westaway, the author of this splendid and most interesting volume, has already to his credit other scientific books which have received high encomiums in responsible quarters. But even he is constrained to make admissions which are none too flattering to modern science. Here are a few citations which speak for themselves:—

> When we come to the region of *cosmogony* we are necessarily in a region which is full of doubt and is necessarily of a highly speculative character. Hypothesis is built on hypothesis; imagination is sometimes allowed to run riot; and not infrequently the most fantastic nonsense is served up with an apparent seriousness of purpose which is likely to deceive all but the very elect. If the cosmogonist happens to be an astronomer of recognized standing, as is sometimes the case, his speculations may be received as if they were of the nature of a fifth gospel. (p. 606)

> All the universe makers seem to have built up their systems on the assumption that radiation from the sun or a star is uniformly propagated in space. Professor F. Soddy, professor of chemistry at Oxford, pertinently asks (*Nature*, 21st February, 1931, 5th September 1931) whether there is any evidence whatever for such an assumption. It is strange how many unverified assumptions underlie many of the basic theories of science. (p. 655)

> What were the successive happenings between the time of the earth's birth and the first appearance of life? Scores of volumes have been written in reply to this question and many ingenious explanatory hypotheses have been put forward, but we are still without definite answers either to that main question or to other questions closely associated with it. (p. 674)

> How the physical and psychical are related we do not know, but that they *are* related is

certain. . . . The relationship is, however, an unsolved mystery. (p. 732)

The neo-Lamarckians and the neo-Darwinians form two rather hostile camps. Each is striving to convert the other, and there are certain rather impatient individuals who sigh for the good old days of the Spanish inquisition. Meanwhile the search for more facts continues, and the undisputed truth may therefore emerge some day. (p. 747)

How did life originate? *We do not know.* All hypotheses concerning it are simply airy speculations. (p. 760)

In view of the above, who will wax enthusiastic over modern science ? It is interesting to recall that in the seventies and eighties of the last century H. P. Blavatsky wrote about modern science in similar terms. She also spoke of " the glaring contradictions, the mutually destructive hypotheses of world-renowned scientists, their mutual accusations, denunciations and disputes," and it was by way of a solution of what she called the " scientific fallacies and gaps " that she gave to the world the ancient esoteric teachings which, she urged, had " as much right to a hearing as any of the so-called learned and academical hypotheses". Madame Blavatsky was, however, like one crying in the wilderness. Confining ourselves to the six problems referred to in the above six extracts from Mr. Westaway's book, we may state that practically all of them are satisfactorily answered in her writings.

In a very interesting article in THE ARYAN PATH for January 1933, Mr. J. D. Beresford, while pointing out the immense superiority of the teachings regarding human evolution given by H. P. Blavatsky to the theories advocated by the Darwinians, stated that he was by no means alone in his belief that the general average of Western intelligence was ready to accept the teachings of the Old Wisdom. We cannot say whether Mr. Westaway belongs to this increasing class of Westerners, but at any rate there is much in his book which goes to show that although he may not be quite conscious of the fact, his study and reflection have led him far in the direction of the Esoteric philosophy. We shall give one or two illustrations. It is refreshing to find Mr. Westaway urging that in view of the entirely new turn which radioactivity in the twentieth century has given to the ideas of transmutation, it is not right to " scoff at the hope which inspired the work of the alchemist." (p. 115). A study of *Isis Unveiled* and of *The Secret Doctrine* will furnish Mr. Westaway with still more cogent reasons why ancient alchemy should not be scoffed at.

Students of Theosophy will be particularly interested in the presentment of the Law of Cycles on pages 1012 *et seq.* by Mr. Westaway who, following the lead of Sir W. M. Flinders Petrie, shows that civilization is a *recurrent* phenomenon, his conclusion about Western civilization being as follows :—

That European civilization has crossed its peak and is definitely declining seems to be probably true, for its wealth is being slowly squandered away, and the craving for leisure and pleasure by some of its peoples is vividly reminiscent of decadent ancient Rome.

This statement is reminiscent of warnings repeatedly given by H. P. Blavatsky in the seventies and eighties of the last century. (cf. *The Secret Doctrine,* Vol. I.)

Then every one knows her famous prediction in *The Secret Doctrine* that in the course of about a decade" there will be a large rent made in the Veil of Nature, and materialistic science will receive a death-blow". Subsequent research and developments in science have proved the truth of this prediction, and the position taken by present-day scientists is thus depicted :—

. . . most men of science are not only ceasing to be materialists but are now rather shy of proclaiming aloud their allegiance to any form of dogmatic philosophy. . . More and more eminent men of science are nowadays increasingly willing to admit that *they do not know.* . . . Despite the few surviving dogmatists, there is a refreshing humility about modern science. Omniscience now seldom finds a claimant. Intellectual integrity now

much more willingly admits that, in the light of newly discovered facts, many old theories and creeds have ceased to be useful and must be abandoned. The same thing applies to the sphere of religion. (pp. 1027–8.)

Mr. Westaway's excellent book, however, is not free from one or two serious defects. He says in the Preface that his book "presents to the layman the main facts of science as they have come down to us through the ages," but in tracing this history he has practically ignored the wonderful contribution to different sciences made by ancient India, disposing of the subject in less than twenty lines (p. 99) while to ancient Greece are devoted forty-six pages. Some fifty years ago, the late Sir William Hunter, the great historian of India, very clearly showed the high proficiency in various sciences attained by India in ancient times, and since then different scholars have thrown further light on the subject. A book like Sir Brajendranath Seal's *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* or Sir P. C. Ray's *History of Indian Chemistry* should convince any impartial man that ancient India had made tremendous headway with various sciences and was far in advance of Greece in this respect.

What is perhaps more indefensible is that our author has also overlooked the claims of the great Indian scientists who have achieved an international reputation in our day. By common consent Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose is one of the world's greatest authorities on plant life, but although fully five pages have been devoted to "Plant Physiology" his name is not even mentioned. Similarly, Sir P. C. Ray's name is omitted, and the name of Sir C. V. Raman appears only in the list of Nobel Prizemen! (p. 1011)

On the whole, however, we have nothing but praise for Mr. Westaway's splendid book, in which he has given us a fine panoramic view of the growth and development of various sciences in the Western world. Mr. Westaway has done good work in having collected such a mass of facts in a compact volume, and in pointing out how even many of the Scientists of to-day are realising the limitations of their knowledge.

J. P. W.

Religion and the European Mind. By Adolf Keller, D. D., LL. D. (The Lutterworth Press, London. 6*s.*)

First published in the United States of America under the title *Religion and Revolution*, Adolf Keller's Stone Lectures delivered at the Theological Seminary in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1933, which have now been issued in an English Edition as Volume IV of the Lutterworth Library, are devoted to a discussion of the permanently persistent and persistently permanent problem of the conflict between the truths that emanate from man and the truth that proceeds from God, which has taken an acute turn in Soviet Russia, Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. In a brief "Introduction" the author brings into the focus of the attention of his readers the central theme of his discussion which is "the struggle of secular religion against the Christian Gospel" (p. 17). The vicissitudes of the great doctrine of "justification by faith" as reflected in Neo-Calvinism and Neo-Lutheranism are sketched in the second and third chapters. Who understands the Reformation correctly? Adherents of the Neo-Lutheran movement, or those of the Neo-Calvinistic? This and allied topics of the continental theological Revolution like "Is God hidden or manifest?" "Bible or History?" "Concrete or Abstract Theology?" etc., are dealt with in the fourth chapter. The fight of German Protestantism with Secularism, *i. e.*, the fight of the

Christian Faith based on God's revelation against man-made religions forms the subject-matter of the fifth chapter. In the concluding chapter the destiny of the Church in a changing world is foreshadowed. Important documents relating to the German Church movement are published in the shape of Appendices.

Dr. Adolf Keller's powerful advocacy of the claims of evangelical life and ethics, evangelical truth and religious liberty, will be readily endorsed by the Vedanta in general and by Theistic, Realistic, and Pluralistic systems in particular. If political Absolutism has been repugnant to the thinking section of mankind, philosophical Absolutism is bound to be more so. There is no need to repeat or perpetuate the amusing mistake that Sankara's monistic Idealism is the only fashionable philosophy of life. The Realism and the Pluralistic Theism of Madhva or Anandatirtha emphasize the doctrine of Divine Grace.

Dr. Keller has pointed out that the religion based on revelation is now obliged to fight a battle royal with man-made religions, such as those implied by nationalism, communism, and similar secularisms. If the Vedas and the Upanishads could be substituted for the Bible, one wonders if Dr. Keller would have become a convert to Vedanta.

In India, I mean the Hindu India, there has always been a keen and acute conflict between a make-believe religious and theological programme, the practical applicability of which is confined to all relevant matters viewed *sub specie temporis*, and a programme grounded on the most intense spiritual awareness of the reality of Divine Grace as the only means of deliverance from the transmigratory cycle.

Modern Europe and America are by no means anxious to translate into practical politics the programme of evangelical ethics, and thinkers like Dean Inge have a formidable task before them when they attempt to effect a synthesis between the man-made religion of an astronomical picture of the world and the revealed religion based on the authority of the Bible.

The Theistic schools of the Vedanta maintained long ago what Karl Barth proclaims, that men are all "sinners and in need of the pardon of God" (p. 164). Monistic Absolutism relegated this pardoning God to the limbo of a lesser degree of reality. A conflict between the two must be inevitable.

Attempts are everywhere visible in modern India to have the man-made religions of nationalism, communism, etc., which have undoubtedly achieved marked success in the West, transplanted to the indigenous soil, and I feel that Dr. Adolf Keller's survey of the theological situation in Europe must convey a significant lesson to those who, acting under the urge of secular, political, and economic enthusiasm, take pride in glorifying the deeds and achievements of men and mankind. Those who are intent on emphasising the well-known parallelism between Christianity and the Theistic systems of the Vedanta will find Dr. Keller's lectures exceedingly interesting. Centuries ago, the Theistic systems of Indian thought emphasised the victory of the word of God over words of men, of the truth of God over truths of men, and of the deed of God over the deeds of men—the deed manifest in His Supreme Grace without which *Moksha* or *Apavarga* cannot be secured.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Scientific Research and Social Needs. By JULIAN HUXLEY. With an Introductory Chapter by Sir William Bragg, and Discussions with Prof. H. Levy, Sir Thomas D. Barlow, K. B. E., and Prof. P.M. S. Blackett (Watts, London. 7*s.*6*d.*)

There was a time, well within the memories of the middle-aged, when every new scientific discovery or invention was hailed with general enthusiasm as one more step on the road to Utopia; but now we are not so sure of this. Never has Science, both theoretical and practical, made such swift progress as it is making to-day; and yet, despite its majestic achievements and the almost complete mastery of physical nature which it has placed in human hands, the world is in a state of political and economic chaos, and humanity resembles nothing so much as a fever patient with a high temperature and slightly delirious.

That Men of Science themselves are not without misgivings about the effect of scientific discovery on social conditions, is indicated by the words of Sir William Bragg, whose introductory chapter is significantly headed "Science: Friend or Enemy?"

Mr. Julian Huxley has undertaken a very remarkable tour in this country. He is studying, broadly speaking, the influence which scientific discovery is exerting upon our lives. He has examined the methods by which research is carried on in various places and for various purposes. He will tell us of the results. And especially he will consider the relations of science to social questions: questions that we are all asking to-day. Is scientific research drawing us together or forcing us apart? Is it to be commended for supplying our needs or blamed for causing unemployment? Does it help to bring peace between the nations, or war? Does it add to mankind's vision, or restrict it? If it is solving some problems, is it perhaps raising others still more difficult and troublesome?

Mr. Huxley's book is an attempt to solve the problem thus outlined by Sir William Bragg: and, if he does not entirely succeed in doing so, he has at least collected a mass of valuable data relating to the subject, which will assist his readers in thinking it out for themselves. In the course of his journeyings Mr. Huxley has investigated the research work which is being done in various places in connection with the production of foodstuffs and other essential raw materials, and with the industrial processes by which these materials are converted into commodities for human use in peace, or human destruction in war. The story he has to tell is of intense interest, and the lay reader will have no difficulty whatever in following his very clear and succinct explanations. His final verdict is, as might be anticipated, favourable to scientific research; and he suggests that what the world needs is not less, but more science, especially in the form of research in psychology and sociology and the application of its results in practical affairs. With this opinion there can be no quarrel, provided that psychologists, in their preoccupation with the subconscious and the emotional, do not lose sight of the spiritual and superconscious factors in man.

There are certain questions of vital importance, suggested by Mr. Huxley's work, which urgently demand a solution if our civilisation is not to drift on blindly without goal or purpose. Many of us take pride in the fact that we are moving rapidly, and are heedless *whither*, forgetting the fate of the Gadarene swine, who also were swift movers and did not pause to consider where their course was leading them. If our civilisation is to acquire a direction—to become an ordered movement instead of a blind drift—we have to make up our minds what things promote, and what mar, the real well-being of a human community; to what extent this essential well-being can be furthered by causes other than the ethical condition of the individuals composing the community, *e. g.*, by the accumulation of objective knowledge or the progress of mechanical invention; and finally whether it is not inevitable that both knowledge and invention, without a concomitant ethical advance, must bring with them a compensating disadvantage for every benefit they bestow upon us.

R. A. V. M.

The Mystical Life. By ROGER BASTIDE (Jonathan Cape, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This remarkably scientific study of the Laws of Mysticism is divided into two parts. The first deals with the psychological state of the mystics, their experiences and sentiments. The second is devoted to an explanation of these processes from the view-points of pathology, psychology and sociology. It gives the threefold classification of the mystical state—the prayer of quiet, the prayer of union, and ecstasy; meditation, contemplation and asceticism being processes towards the last state (compare Patañjali's *Yoga*). Real Mysticism is the permanent and joyous union, the "Spiritual Marriage," of the soul with God. The "graces" such as visions, locutions, power to prophesy, gift of languages, levitation and stigmata, which usually are recognized as Mysticism by the crowd are only external phenomena and are of secondary importance. The author admits that the Mystical constitution is no doubt "psychasthenic" and "pithiatic," characterised by scruples, aboulia, obsessions, anguish, self-delusion and even dementia. But psychiatry cannot offer a satisfactory explanation. There is all the difference between the two that there is between "Genius" and "Madness". Nor is Mysticism a disease of the attention, of the will or of the religious feeling. The author classifies Mystics into four distinct groups—the Enthusiast or Illuminate, the Quietist, the Constructive and the Prophet.

The book displays, in general, insufficient knowledge of Hindu Mysticism, which is defined as "suicide," "a preparation for Death". The state of "Spiritual Marriage" is reached not only in Christianity and Islam, but is largely in evidence in the *Nāyakī-Nāyaka Bhāva* of the Śaiva and Vaishṇava saints. The author misses a point when he understands "*Dhyāna*" to mean "Ecstasy". It is only a state of meditation, prayer and contemplation. Ecstasy is *Ānanda,* and denotes the joyous and enduring union with the Infinite. "*Ānanda* is *Brahman*". Graces, such as locutions (*aśarira vāk*) and visions are deemed low in the scale of Mystical values. But can the "Vision" (*Diwyadṛshti*) of the "Supreme Personality" (*Viśvarupa*) be classed with the other imperfect forms as a mere external phenomenon?

So far as it goes, however, this book is characterised by clarity of thought and consistent sanity of judgment; and provides a working ground for distinguishing fact from fiction in Mystical experience. The metaphysical aspect is outside its province; but here rather would seem to lie much of the explanation sought for mystical phenomena. The mystery of Mysticism lies beyond the battery of physical sciences.

S. V. VISWANATHA

Eranos-Jahrbuch 1933: Yoga und Meditation im Osten und im Westen. Ed. by OLGA FRÖBE-KAPTEYN.

The objective of the Ascona Conference of August, 1933, is plain from the sub-title of this symposium of quite uneven interest and value. The East is not directly represented and the attitude towards its wisdom ranges widely. The distinguished psychologist, Dr. C. G. Jung, admits that "In the West, despite our so-called culture, we are still barbarians and children in regard to the psychic."

Mrs. Rhys Davids makes a significant contribution on the Dhyāna cult of early Buddhism.

> In Dhyāna we see man hastening the work of becoming by entering into relations with those fellow men who, since they have already passed beyond the veil, have advanced farther in knowledge than himself, and from them he learns.

Several of the other lectures leave the uneasy impression of children playing happily with dynamite and inviting others to join their game.

Ph. D.

CORRESPONDENCE

ANCIENT AND MODERN IDEAS OF PRALAYA

Madame Blavatsky was perhaps the first and foremost thinker to point out the epochal confirmations of ancient Eastern Wisdom by modern Western science. Using the material supplied by her, Dr. Hart wrote in THE ARYAN PATH of May 1934 (p. 296) to show that the old conceptions of Pralaya are being accepted by modern science. These few words are just to support Dr. Hart's view.

According to Hindu thinkers there are four kinds of Pralaya—Nitya, Naimittika, Prakritika and Atyantika, The first one is the "perpetual" Pralaya, the constant imperceptible changes undergone by the atoms, the stages of growth and decay; it is subjective, corresponding to bodily changes which take place in sleep. The second is described in Manu Samhita and the Puranas. It is the dissolution of the Universe at the end of one Day of Brahmā. According to the *Gita*, (vii 17), Brahma's Day is equal to one thousand yugas of human calculation. The fact of Prakritika Pralaya is borne out by the developments of modern physics. According to this view all the worlds dissolve into Primordial Substance or Mulaprakriti at the end of a Life of Brahmā.

Dr. Jeans, says in his *Eos* that the universe will ultimately dissolve into radiation. He says, "There will be neither sunlight neither starlight but only a cool glow of radiation uniformly diffused through space." Both Sir James Jeans and Sir Oliver Lodge believe that a reverse process will commence. They incline to the belief in another cycle of creation, or rather projection (as the Sanskrit word "Sristi" really means). This Prakritika or Cyclic Pralaya is thus scientific as well as scriptural. Sristi is Anādi or changefully eternal, according to Hindu philosophy. Out of the womb of infinite space universes are projected and that they again merge into the same is the view supported by science and the Shastras.

There are three kinds of Sristi also—Arambhavada, Parinamavada and Vivartavada. In the phraseology of modern thought they may be termed creationism, evolutionism and illusionism. The last is the theory propounded by Advaita Vedanta, in the view of which the world is a mirage. Sir James Jeans concludes *Eos* by making a close approach to this Hindu position. He suggests towards the end of the book that "the Universe after all may be a dream, a creation of our own mind in which nothing exists except itself".

Closely related to Pralaya is Manvantara, the age cycle between two Manus. In Hindu mythology there is mention of fourteen Manus. It is interesting to note that the idea of Manu or the First Man is found in many nations. The roots of this word in other languages prove it. In Sanskrit it is called Manu; in English man; in Anglo-Saxon, man: in German, Mann; in Swedish, man; in Icelandic, mannr; in Danish, mand; etc. One human year is said to be a day of the Gods. In such calculations 71 Maha Yugas of 306,720,000 mortal years make one Manvantara.

The late Charles Johnston in his article on "The Destiny of Man" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, 1931, observed that "India is far closer to the most modern cosmological conceptions than Hellas ever was." "The noteworthy fact of the most recent results as embodied in the splendidly imaginative writings of Sir J. Jeans and Sir A. Eddington, is that they are singularly like the views taught milleniums back in Ancient India. Buddha teaching 2500 years ago speaks of a million million worlds."

Mysore. SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———————— *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS.

The Presidential Address of Sir James Jeans delivered last September in Aberdeen before the British Association for the Advancement of Science contains several striking ideas to which the attention of students, not only of Physics, but even of Philosophy, may be drawn. To-day we have space for a few remarks on the point raised by Sir James at the end of his address on science, morality and religion. He said:—

> We cannot ignore the tragic fact that, as our President of two years ago told us, science has given man control over Nature before he has gained control over himself. This is only one chapter of a long story—human nature changes very slowly, and so for ever lags behind human knowledge, which accumulates very rapidly.

The statement naturally raises the question—how does this happen? Moreover, has it been ever and always so? Sir James further said:—

> Thus, in respect of knowledge, each generation stands on the shoulders of its predecessor, but in respect of human nature, both stand on the same ground.

Shall we take it for granted that the builders of Mohenjo Daro, the Chaldees of Ur, the teachers of Egypt, did not possess the knowledge we possess—nay, even more wisdom than our scholars carry in their heads? Next, if scientific knowledge is not capable of elevating morality, of inspiring noble living, then surely its value must be counted as meagre. Sir James continued:—

> These are hard facts which we cannot hope to alter, and which—we may as well admit—may wreck civilization. If there is an avenue of escape, it does not, as I see it, lie in the direction of less science, but of more science—psychology, which holds out hopes that, for the first time in his long history, man may be enabled to obey the command "Know thyself"; to which, I, for one, would like to see adjoined a morality and, if possible, even a religion, consistent with our new psychological knowledge and the established facts of science.

But ages before the Delphic Oracle enjoined man to self-study there were minds who had sought and found Wisdom and there were hearts touched by nobility so profound that they were able to translate that knowledge into action. Sir James desires a morality and a religion founded on scientific facts and he mentions "eugenics and birth-control," etc. But does up-to-date science *know* facts in such matters? Can Sir James say that psychologists and psycho-analysts and eugenists know, positively know, a sufficient number of facts to use them for constructing a morality and a religion? We trow not. Science has yet to go a great way before it can evolve a code of morality which would inspire the

race of mortals as do the Sermon on the Mount, the sermons of the Buddha, and those of Krishna in the *Gita*.

To-day mass-morality is not high, and is shot through and through with pornographic themes. Various factors have combined to force on the public attention the different problems connected with sex. Psycho-analysis, eugenics, marriage-hygiene, etc., are freely discussed not only by experts possessing knowledge, but by pseudo-experts who are a danger to public morality and education. One of the phases of this general talk is round the problem of sterilization; and it is more than mere talk. Several states have tried to maintain their moral health by sterilizing some of their prisoners—as in some parts of the U. S. A. Nazi Germany obsessed by the devil of race-purity has rushed into sterilizing large numbers; we might describe it as an act of childish conceit, but it must be characterized more strongly because of the grave injury to the masses. Dr. Lawenthal of Nice in *Mercure de France* (1st April) examines the whole problem in an illuminating article on "Eugenics, Prenuptial Examination and Sterilization". Sterilization is most intimately connected with the problem of heredity and the article offers striking instances from which we take the following:—

D'Alembert was the illegitimate son of a courtier of average intelligence, a libertine, a gambler and a *gourmand*. His mother was one of the most immorally shameless and abject women of that time. Brought up in such an atmosphere the child had numerous chances to become corrupted. Luck made his mother abandon him and a family of honest labourers then adopted him. He became the greatest mathematician of his era, with a remarkable literary talent and a great encyclopædic knowledge, a man of rare modesty and integrity. . . .

Michel-Angelo was son of a brute of a father who harboured an instinctive hatred against art and who tried to kill all taste for it in his genius-child by beating him atrociously, so much so that he rendered him infirm.

It is to a drunkard suffering from *delirium tremens* and probably a wreck, that we owe Beethoven, the creator of modern music . . . .

The father of Goethe, one of the greatest poets and thinkers, was a *psychopathe, heredo-avare* and brother to an idiot—a triple claim to sterilization. . . .

Leonardo da Vinci...was the illegitimate son of a female servant and a clerk.

Imagine these parents sterilized! Poorer the world would be without D'Alembert, Michel-Angelo, Beethoven, Goethe, and Leonardo da Vinci.

Not only on the score of sane morality and of sound health of body and mind is sterilization wrong, but also in the light of heredity the Germans are frustrating their very object of producing a pure race of immortals by hastily adopting sterilization.

As ethics and morality are intimately connected with religious beliefs they have lost caste; effete theological dogmas and vain religious rites and ceremonies are being brushed aside by the thoughtful everywhere, but they do not like to see the foundations of the moral edifice weakening. There is a general desire for right philosophy as an aid to daily life. While many are looking to science for such aid, a growing number recognize that science has not sufficient knowledge to offer a noble line of correct conduct for decent living. What about philosophy? The International Congress of Philosophy recently held at Prague offered little consolation. Of the many papers read there most dealt with metaphysical speculations of interest to the academician; hardly any offered substantial aid to the earnest enquirer to acquire a new attitude to life and to reshape his own mode of existence. However the difference between the philosophy that is a means to culture or a political weapon and the philosophy that is a power in life was emphasised by Herr Paul Feldkeller of Berlin.

> The first philosophers were what true philosophers at all times have been: *men who lived, not men who taught.* The occasional teaching was in response to the wishes of eventual pupils. The endeavour to make proselytes and found schools arose only with the Sophists. The philosophy of a thinker did not record itself in speeches and books but in his actions, his conduct of life. The ancient itinerant philosophers of India, China and the Near East, the Pythagoreans, the Socratics and Cynics, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Renaissance philosophers...*they all lived philosophy*...The time is coming when philosophy will once more be lived. Philosophy that is lived, however, knows how to keep silence. And the ages of political dictators and despotism have been by no means always unfruitful periods for truth. They worked selectively; they strengthened character. For genuine philosophy is neither a department of instruction nor a means to culture; it does not make the life of its follower easier but more difficult. It prepares him inwardly for martyrdom. *But the philosophy that helps mankind can only be the esoteric.*

Herr Feldkeller here puts his finger on a great truth. The only philosophy worthy of the name is that which does express itself in life. Intellectual subtleties and metaphysical abstractions in themselves can save no man from sin and suffering. It is otherwise when high concepts are grasped and put to use in life of every day. The application of philosophy is ethics which do not relate alone to his material and evanescent part, but sink into and take hold of the real man within.

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